Review: Lee Smolin’s The Trouble with Physics
I came across Lee Smolin’s work while researching a paper which I’ve mentioned here before, i.e., ‘In Search of a Fundamental Level’. It was Smolin’s work on Loop Quantum Gravity which interested me. The paper still needs a lot of work and I hope to test some of the ideas at the Structure and Identity conference in Bristol this weekend, where I will be presenting the paper. Anyway, this post is devoted to Lee Smolin’s 2006 book, The Trouble with Physics, which I recently read, and which I highly recommend.
The Trouble with Physics
The book is essentially a critique of string theory, although that really only provides a framework for a broader and deeper discussion of the state of physics and science, the philosophy of science and problems in the academia. Smolin’s writing is enjoyable and I kept nodding by myself enthusiastically through most of the book. However, at times it may feel that the themes of the book are not quite connected, or they are discussed only superficially. Smolin does not go into much detail about some of the relevant background in physics, such as gauge theories, so unless the reader is already familiar with much of contemporary physics it can sometimes seem that too much is assumed. Having said that, Smolin makes it incredibly easy to grasp the major problems of contemporary physics (he lists five of them: the problem of quantum gravity, the foundations of quantum mechanics, the unification of particles and forces, the fixing of the values of the free constants in the standard model, and the nature of dark matter and dark energy). All in all the only flaw in the book to my mind is that it could’ve been longer and gone into more detail on some of the issues. Smolin does have other books which do just that though, such as his 1997 book The Life of the Cosmos, which I quite fancy reading now.
Much of Smolin’s discussion of string theory focuses on a simple theme: because string theory has failed to make any empirically testable predictions and is hence not falsifiable, at least not in the usual sense, it does not deserve the dominant position that it currently has in theoretical physics. Indeed, it is not even a particularly well formulated theory. Smolin discusses the scientific, historical and sociological causes for the current state of theoretical physics in which it seems that the only viable career choice is to engage in research concerning one of the currently fashionable problems in string theory. This discussion is fascinating in that it gives an insider’s look into the everyday work of theoretical physicists — it is remarkable how many similarities one can find between Smolin’s description of the less admirable aspects of the endeavours of theoretical physicists and those of philosophers.
Philosophers may find Smolin’s discussion of the philosophy of science rather superficial, but one must keep in mind that the book is written for the layman who lacks philosophical education. Besides, it is clear that Smolin himself does have a good grasp of the relevant issues, although his discussion of the work of Popper for instance may lack the input of more recent work in the philosophy of science. Still, Smolin actually met Feyerabend several times and he has some funny anecdotes to share.
Although Smolin’s discussion of contemporary physics and string theory in particular are extremely interesting, I thought, rather surprisingly, that the best aspect of the book is the discussion concerning the sociological aspects of science. Some of this discussion, such as Smolin’s application of the so called ‘group think’ idea to the behaviour of the string theory community is perhaps a bit too simplified, but I have no doubt that there is an element of truth to it. Smolin also seems to be particularly concerned about the prospects of young researchers and about the fact that they are not being encouraged to ‘think for themselves’ and to pursue risky, original research projects. Rather, if one wishes to embark on a successful career in theoretical physics, it seems that jumping right into some fashionable aspect of the dominant field, i.e., string theory, is the only way to go. It strikes me that the situation, although certainly not as drastic as it seems to be in theoretical physics, is rather similar in philosophy: it is extremely difficult to sell a research project which deviates from accepted philosophical dogmas. I think that the Quinean conception of ontological commitment is a good example of such a dogma — which is all the more ironic given that Quine’s best known paper was entitled ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’! Let me quote a passage from Smolin concerning research ethics which I think is probably descriptive of much of academia (p. 306):
Adherence to the shared ethic is never perfect, so there is always room for improvement in the practice of science. This seems especially true today, when fashion appears to be playing too large a role, at least in physics. You know this is happening whenever there are bright young PhDs who tell you privately that they would rather be doing X but are doing Y because that is the direction or technique championed by powerful older people, and they thus feel the need to do Y to get funding or a job. Of course, in science as in other areas, there are always a few who choose to do X in spite of the clear evidence that the doers of Y are better rewarded in the short term. Among them are the people who will most likely lead the next generation. Thus the progress of science may be slowed by orthodoxy and fashion, but as long as there is room for those who do X instead of Y, it cannot be stopped completely
Smolin’s greatest concern is the relative lack of room for those who choose to do X. I share that concern, perhaps because I happen to be doing something like X myself! In any case, the real lesson of The Trouble with Physics is that we should not become bogged down with a fashionable approach to a certain problem, even if it seems to enjoy wide support. That’s not how science (or philosophy) works; we need to have several parallel lines of research while knowing full well that only one of them may be correct. The problem is that we can never be certain which one of them it is — more often than not the correct line of research has turned out not to be the most popular one.
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