Indeterminism Ltd Kickoff Workshop
In a few days I’m setting off to Utrecht in the Netherlands for the Indeterminism Ltd Kickoff Workshop, January 12-13. This is the first event of Thomas Müller’s ERC funded research project on free will, determinism, and related issues. I’m pleased to be one of the invited speakers at the workshop, where I will talk about substance causation, with special attention to E. J. Lowe’s work on the topic.
A list of speakers and their topics is available on the workshop website. The speakers are Hans Briegel, Martin van Hees, Annemarie Kalis, Anna Marmodoro, Alexander Reutlinger, Markus Schlosser, Charlotte Werndl, and me. I have not worked much in this area, but I’m quite interested in the metaphysical background of libertarian accounts of free will, which is one of the key themes of the research project. I’ve been reading Lowe’s Personal Agency (2008, OUP), which I find agreeable in parts, but I’m still making up my mind on some of these issues. A lot in Lowe’s project hangs on the feasibility of substance causation, and his idea that all causation is substance causation in particular. In my talk I’ll explore this idea, and especially the problem of how we can get knowledge of substance causation. My initial impression is that substance causation may only be intelligible if we accept Lowe’s non-Cartesian substance dualism as well. The abstract of my talk is below.
Tuomas Tahko – On the Very Idea of Substance Causation
The idea of substance causation is central to libertarian accounts of free will in particular, as the possibility of substance causation is required for agent-causal accounts, which are perhaps the most promising choice for libertarians. In this paper I will assess some arguments against the possibility of substance causation and also attempt to clarify E. J. Lowe’s idea that all causation is substance causation – without committing myself to this view. My goal is to determine how Lowe can or should reply to usual arguments against substance causation, and to see what kind of prospects agent-causal accounts have based on all this.
Hi Tuomas – this sounds quite interesting! – Too bad I am not based in Europe! (maybe that will change LOL). Anyway, regardless of the ‘free will’ side of this issue, it seems to me that there are serious problems with the conception of causality associated with the ‘determinist’ thesis, problems which arise out of a better understanding of the category of matter. I have the impression that you have many irons in your fire, but I’d be happy if at some point you’d take a look at what I’m doing in this area at the moment. Anyway, enjoy the workshop! – best, Henry
Thanks Henry! I’m in Utrecht now, giving my talk tomorrow. Bit of a long way to come for me as I’ve already settled in North Carolina, but I trust that the workshop will be good.
Thanks for the tip, I’ll look up your work on this. I wouldn’t be surprised if the notion of causality at use is suspicious. It’s certainly one of the notions which those who know their physics, like James Ladyman, complain about when it comes to metaphysicians’ typical use of it.