My paper ‘Counterfactuals and Modal Epistemology’ has finally appeared in print, in Grazer Philosophische Studien (Vol 86). The official publication date of the volume is 2012, but for some reason it’s still not available at Grazer‘s online venue, Ingentaconnect — I get the feeling that Rodopi, which publishes the journal, is not quite up to par. Anyway, I thought that Grazer is a nice venue for the paper, given that it’s effectively a commentary of Tim Williamson’s counterfactual account of modality, which was published as ‘Philosophical Knowledge and Knowledge of Counterfactuals’ in Grazer as well as chapter five of his The Philosophy of Philosophy. Whether or not the official online version ever sees the light of day, you can download my paper from PhilPapers or directly from here. Abstract also below.

Talking about modal epistemology, I’ve promised to contribute to a volume on ‘Modal Empiricism’ — more details in due course…

Abstract:

What is our epistemic access to metaphysical modality? Timothy Williamson suggests that the epistemology of counterfactuals will provide the answer. This paper challenges Williamson’s account and argues that certain elements of the epistemology of counterfactuals that he discusses, namely so called background knowledge and constitutive facts, are already saturated with modal content which his account fails to explain. Williamson’s account will first be outlined and the role of background knowledge and constitutive facts analysed. Their key role is to restrict our imagination to rule out irrelevant counterfactual suppositions. However, background knowledge turns out to be problematic in cases where we are dealing with metaphysically possible counterfactual suppositions that violate the actual laws of physics. As we will see, unless Williamson assumes that background knowledge corresponds with the actual, true laws of physics and that these laws are metaphysically necessary, it will be difficult to address this problem. Furthermore, Williamson’s account fails to accommodate the distinction between conceivable yet metaphysically impossible scenarios, and conceivable and metaphysically possible scenarios. This is because background knowledge and constitutive facts are based strictly on our knowledge of the actual world. Williamson does attempt to address this concern with regard to metaphysical necessities – as they hold across all possible worlds – but we will see that even in this case the explanation is questionable. These problems, it will be suggested, cannot be addressed in a counterfactual account of the epistemology of modality. The paper finishes with an analysis of Williamson’s possible rejoinders and some discussion about the prospects of an alternative account of modal epistemology.

I’ve just returned from Japan, from a combined holiday and work trip (although working was on the light side!). I met some philosophers in Kyoto (thanks to Ricki Bliss) and Tokyo — analytic metaphysics seems to be on the rise in Japan. Another sign of this is that my book, Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics is being translated into Japanese.

Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics (CUP, 2012)

I had the pleasure to meet the person in charge of the Japanese edition, Professor Daisuke Kachi (Saitama University) as well as the excellent group of young Japanese metaphysicians working on the translation in Tokyo. The Japanese edition will be published by ShunJusha Publishing Company and is in the capable hands of Mr. Kouji Kobayashi, who arranged our meeting in Tokyo. ShunJusha has previously published Japanese editions of books by Ted Sider, Michael Dummett, Donald Davidson, Alex Rosenberg, and Alva Noë, among others — not a bad list to be on!

The project is already well under way and the Japanese edition may be published as soon as late 2013, but we’ll see what happens. I’ll get two free copies so will make sure to post a picture in due course. The hardback has done reasonably well in sales terms and I hope that the Japanese edition will be a success. I recommend keeping a close eye on the developments in Japanese philosophy and analytic metaphysics in particular, as there seems to be an untapped market.

I should add that I was treated to an amazing meal at a Shojin Ryori restaurant called Bon (in the Fucha Ryori tradition, in fact). The Japanese hospitality is overwhelming.

More (non-academic) details about my trip to Japan anon.

Below you’ll find the penultimate version of my review of E. J. Lowe’s More Kinds of Being: A Further Study of Individuation, Identity, and the Logic of Sortal Terms (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), forthcoming in Mind. You can also download it here. I also recommend Gary Rosenkrantz’s longer review of the book at NDPR.

More Kinds of Being: A Further Study of Individuation, Identity, and the Logic of Sortal Terms, by E. J. Lowe. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. Pp. xii + 227. H/b £70.00.

More Kinds of Being marks the 20th anniversary of Kinds of Being (1989). This second expanded edition adds three new chapters as well as revised content and updated references. The new edition is very welcome, since the original book is all but a collector’s item. This is a sign of the importance of the book, finally available to a new generation of readers.

Lowe: More Kinds of Being

Although much of the original book’s content remains relevant, Lowe has also made important progress on its themes. The most significant development is his four-category ontology (developed in his The Four-Category Ontology, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), which is briefly presented in a new section of Chapter 1 (pp. 8–11). Whereas in Kinds of Being Lowe was primarily interested in the distinction between particular objects and the kinds that they instantiate, in More Kinds of Being two further categories of being are included, namely attributes (which characterize kinds) and modes (or tropes, as they are often called). However, the relevance of these additional categories is somewhat limited, as the logic of sortal terms developed in the original book remains unchanged.

One of Lowe’s primary motives is to provide a basis for the individuation of natural kinds and the natural laws that they are subject to. Lowe focuses on a study of concrete and natural sorts or kinds, though he does acknowledge artefactual and abstract kinds as well. The reason for this choice of emphasis is that Lowe, quite correctly, considers the most interesting questions of identity and individuation to concern the kinds of things that ‘carve at the joints’. Furthermore, Lowe thinks that our inquiry into what sorts of things ‘carve at the joints’ is guided by a mixture of a priori principles and scientific a posteriori elements (p. 3). These methodological assumptions concerning the ‘naturalness’ regarding kinds turn out to be of some importance.

Let me summarise Lowe’s primary claims. Chapter 2 is concerned with the criteria of identity of sortal terms, presenting a neo-Aristotelian, metaphysical-cum-semantic analysis of sortals and the tools for individuating them. Chapter 3 clarifies the distinction between attribution and instantiation, with reference to the views of Geach and Quine. Chapter 4, new to this edition, focuses on the metaphysical basis of countability by exploring the concepts of number, unity, and individuality. Chapter 5 argues against the thesis known as ‘relativity of identity’ familiar from Geach, and in defence of absolute identity—a view also defended by Wiggins. Chapter 6 presents further evidence against relative identity by examining familiar problems regarding identity and constitution, such as the problem of the 1,001 cats. Chapter 7 is a brief study of the related notion of parthood. Chapter 8 puts some of the formal tools of the previous chapters to use by presenting a thorough analysis of how persons are related to their bodies. Lowe’s primary claim here is that persons are ‘basic’ kinds in the sense that no informative identity criteria can be given for them—he argues that persons cannot be identified with their bodies. Chapter 9 is a study of the relationship between sortal terms and natural laws; Lowe holds that the latter necessarily involve the former. In fact, Lowe considers laws to be ‘natural’ precisely because they concern natural kinds. Chapter 10, new to this edition, specifies the implications of Lowe’s views regarding plural quantification and sortal reference, pointing towards an ‘objectual’ rather than a ‘substitutional’ interpretation of quantifiers. Chapter 11 lays out Lowe’s preferred system of sortal logic, ‘formalized sortal language’ or FSL. Chapter 12, also new to this edition, extends FSL to accommodate sentences containing sortal terms and sketches Lowe’s view regarding our epistemic access to ‘genuine’ sortals.

Lowe has added references to his recent work and to other relevant research conducted since the publication of the original book, but the bulk of More Kinds of Being is still presented in the context of the discussion that was active when the first edition was published—the work of Geach and Wiggins in particular receives abundant attention. While the themes are still very much relevant, this may give a dated feel to some of the discussions, such as the discussion of parthood in Chapter 7.

As the preceding summary will have made clear, More Kinds of Being is a dense and rich book. Lowe’s arguments are extremely clear and to a large extent convincing, but in the remainder of this review I’d like to point out two general points in need of clarification. The first of these concerns the claim that persons are unanalysable, ‘basic’ kinds (Chapter 8). Lowe makes a strong case for the claim that persons are not to be identified with their bodies, as he has argued elsewhere (e.g. his Personal Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). But there is one aspect of this account that I find troubling. The following passage in which Lowe anticipates the physicalist’s reaction serves to illustrate my concern.

Before one can even begin to consider what kinds of empirical evidence there might be in support of the thesis that each or any psychological state is identifiable with some physiological state, one must not only have some grasp of the identity-conditions of physiological states – whether stated in terms of their causes and effects, or in some other terms – one must also have some independent grasp of the identity-conditions of psychological states. (p. 136)

I think that this is exactly right. However, Lowe’s conclusion is revealing, for he acknowledges that the case for persons being ‘basic’ kinds relies on the elimination of alternatives, namely attempts to provide criteria of identity for persons. An opponent might reply as follows: It is exactly because the criteria of identity for persons require both a grasp of the identity-conditions of physiological states and the identity-conditions of psychological states that persons appear to be unanalysable. Lowe himself identifies two likely candidates for these identity-conditions, namely ‘bodily criteria’ and ‘memory criteria’, but insists that these are not metaphysical-cum-semantic criteria; rather, they are merely ‘evidential’ criteria (p. 138–9). Neither of these criteria by themselves is likely to be sufficient, but why would they not be sufficient if taken together? As Lowe insists, an independent grasp of each set of criteria is required in any case. Could we not proceed with the combination of these two sets of criteria even if it is exceedingly difficult to determine how they are linked? Indeed, this link is exactly what future work on personal identity should focus on.

The second issue concerns the already mentioned, important role of ‘naturalness’ in Lowe’s account of sortals. I believe that Lowe is correct about this role, but his account of what constitutes a genuine natural kind requires specification. Lowe writes: ‘With regard to the distinction between natural and non-natural kinds, my own view is that the crucial distinguishing feature of natural kinds is that they are subjects of natural law’ (p. 5). Plausible as this is in cases such as the kind gold, it is less so with regard to Lowe’s other favourite example, namely the kind mammal. He mentions ‘distinctively mammalian laws’ such as mammals being warm-blooded and suckling their young. Now, these are evidently dispositions that mammals have, which is what leads Lowe to give them the status of laws and hence mammals the status of a natural kind. However, the problematic status of biological classifications such as mammal taxa are well known and it is far from clear that such taxonomy accurately ‘carves at the joints’, even if we grant the dispositions that Lowe mentions.

This leads me to worry that the strong link between sortal terms and natural law on the one hand, and natural law and natural kinds on the other hand (as discussed in Chapter 9), has not been fully justified. Lowe is probably right in that ‘statements of natural law unavoidably carry reference to sorts or kinds’ (p. 156). But it has not been established that these kinds must be ‘genuine’ natural kinds. To be fair, Lowe has written about this topic elsewhere in more detail, as well as in the new Chapter 12. Still, the claim that sortals reflect, as Lowe puts it, ‘real boundaries in nature’ (p. 214) is of crucial importance for his project, and the unfamiliar reader might find More Kinds of Being lacking in argument in this regard (for further discussion, see my ‘Boundaries in Reality’, Ratio 25 (4), 2012, pp. 405–24).

The two issues I have raised only serve to highlight the originality of Lowe’s work. More Kinds of Being is a remarkable book. It sets the stage for numerous debates in metaphysics, philosophical logic, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind that are sure to continue much longer than another two decades.

After spending some ten months in the review process, I’m pleased that my article ‘Soames’s Deflationism About Modality‘ is finally seeing the light of day in Erkenntnis. Although it took a while, I got some remarkably helpful and acute comments from one anonymous referee and I believe that the paper is much better for them. As the title suggest, I focus on Scott Soames’s account of modality, which he has sketched in a number of books and articles, most notably Beyond Rigidity (2002, OUP) and Reference and Description (2005, Princeton). The idea for the paper came to me when I saw a call for papers for a workshop with Soames in Cologne; it took place in 2010 (I wrote about it here). I gave one of the four talks at the workshop and my paper there was a sort of a pre-cursor to the Erkenntnis paper, although it in fact split into two papers (no doubt you’ll hear about the other part in due course…). Anyway, it was a pleasure to meet Soames, who seemed receptive to my argument. I’ve sharpened the main idea somewhat in the present paper, we’ll see if Soames reacts. The abstract is below and the penultimate version is available here.

One type of deflationism about metaphysical modality suggests that it can be analysed strictly in terms of linguistic or conceptual content and that there is nothing particularly metaphysical about modality. Scott Soames is explicitly opposed to this trend. However, a detailed study of Soames’s own account of modality reveals that it has striking similarities with the deflationary account. In this paper I will compare Soames’s account of a posteriori necessities concerning natural kinds with the deflationary one, specifically Alan Sidelle’s account, and suggest that Soames’s account is vulnerable to the deflatonist’s critique. Furthermore, I conjecture that both the deflationary account and Soames’s account fail to fully explicate the metaphysical content of a posteriori necessities. Although I will focus on Soames, my argument may have more general implications towards the prospects of providing a meaning-based account of metaphysical modality.

My article ‘Boundaries in Reality’ has just been published in Ratio, volume 25 (4), pp. 405-424. Get it while it’s hot! You can download the penultimate version here if you don’t have online access to the journal, or get it straight through PhilPapers.

The article is part of a special issue on Classifying Reality, edited by David S. Oderberg. The other contributors to this issue are E. J. Lowe, D. H. Mellor, Stephen Boulter, Gary S. Rosenkrantz, and Barry Smith. Very interesting collection of articles, so be sure to take a look! The articles will later be reprinted in an anthology, by Wiley-Blackwell.

I discuss the idea that there must be some joints or structure in reality and present a provisional argument to the effect that this is indeed the case. A large motivation for the paper is the type of extreme conventionalism put forward recently by Achille Varzi, in his paper ‘Boundaries, Conventions, and Realism’, published last year in an intriguing volume called Carving Nature at Its Joints: Natural Kinds in Metaphysics and Science. Hope you like it!

Abstract below:

This paper defends the idea that there must be some joints in reality, some correct way to classify or categorize it. This may seem obvious, but we will see that there are at least three conventionalist arguments against this idea, as well as philosophers who have found them convincing. The thrust of these arguments is that the manner in which we structure, divide or carve up the world is not grounded in any natural, genuine boundaries in the world. Ultimately they are supposed to pose a serious threat to realism. The first argument that will be examined concerns the claim that there are no natural boundaries in reality, the second one focuses on the basis of our classificatory schemes, which the conventionalist claims to be merely psychological, and the third considers the significance of our particular features in carving up the world, such as physical size and perceptual capabilities. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that none of these objections succeed in undermining the existence of genuine joints in reality.