Archive for category: Science

The Philosophical Significance of the Higgs ‘Discovery’

04 Jul
July 4, 2012

Today, the ‘discovery’ of the elusive Higgs Boson was announced at CERN. ‘Discovery’ in scare quotes, because when dealing with the criteria for new discoveries in fundamental physics, there is always some arbitrariness, which I will explain in a moment. I’ve just watched the live webcast of the talks at CERN today, and as expected, they were built around the announcement that the Higgs has been discovered at ~125 GeV.

There are plenty of excellent resources in the internet explaining the significance of the Higgs boson, and the ramifications that the discovery has for future physics. CERN has a sort of FAQ about the Higgs here. In addition, see for instance Richard Ruiz’s post ‘What Comes Next’ in the Quantum Diaries blog, or Matt Strassler’s ‘Why the Higgs Particle Matters’ in his Of Particular Significance blog. Both blogs are full of interesting and useful posts on the Higgs and related matters. But as interesting as all these posts from the point of view of physicists are, they leave open several questions that might be of interest to philosophers. In this post I will attempt to address some of those questions, and analyse the philosophical significance of the Higgs.

As a disclaimer, I have to emphasise that I’m by no means an expert on particle physics, and a lot of what I say below builds on the material from the mentioned sources. I also wrote this rather hastily while listening to the talks, so I apologise for any errors in the science. However, these should have little effect on my philosophical analysis in any case.

The facts, in my understanding, are as follows:

  • Both of the independent groups, ATLAS and CMS, presented strong results to the effect that there is a Higgs boson near 125 GeV.
  • Although all the data is compatible with the discovered boson being the Standard Model Higgs, there is no confirmation of this yet.
  • The picture could be much more complicated than what has been seen so far; there may be a number of other Higgs bosons, corresponding to different Higgs fields.
  • What was discovered is most likely a scalar particle (with a spin of zero), and helps to explain electroweak symmetry breaking, but the details remain open.

Now, to begin with, something should be said about what constitutes a “discovery”. As I understand it, particle physics has an accepted definition for what is sufficient to claim a discovery: 5.0 sigma significance, i.e. level of certainty up to five standard deviations. In statistical terms, this means a probability of less than one in a million that the observed phenomenon is produced by something else than the postulated Higgs, namely statistical fluctuation. The reason for this type of talk is of course that the Higgs cannot be observed directly. Rather, we can observe decay products, such as photons, which could be produced by a number of phenomena that have to be ruled out. This also makes it quite clear that there is always an aspect of fallibility in these types of results.

We have a discovery! (Ripped off from Joe Incandela's (CMS) talk today.)

We have a discovery! (Ripped off from Joe Incandela’s (CMS) talk today.)

Interestingly, at the press conference after the talks at CERN, the journalists (most of whom asked pretty idiotic questions) kept asking whether it is the Higgs that has been discovered, clearly not quite understanding what they even mean by the Higgs. Part of the problem, I think, is that the people answering the questions were experimental physicists, not theoretical. They could’ve done a better job explaining the theory. To put it simply, we’re looking for an explanation for the electroweak symmetry breaking familiar from the Higgs mechanism. The Higgs mechanism postulates the Higgs field which is responsible for the masses of elementary particles. In some sense, the Higgs is just whatever serves the purpose of explaining this phenomenon. But in effect I think that people are associating this with the Standard Model Higgs, i.e. the Higgs that has the properties compatible with the standard model (among other things, a spin of zero). Right now, this question remains open. Emphasising the words of Rolf Heuer, I would say that there is a Higgs, because whatever has been discovered, it’s at least a part of the explanation for the electroweak symmetry breaking, but it might not be the explanation fully compatible with the Standard Model.

In the interviews at CERN aired after the main event, Philip Warren Anderson, who postulated the Higgs mechanism in 1962, said something quite interesting about the original modelling of the Higgs mechanism and the postulation of the Higgs. He indicated that back in the sixties they didn’t expect that the model was anything more than that: an interesting model which probably has little to do with real physics. In particular, Anderson praised ‘imagination’ as the source of the modelling, emphasising that it’s ‘simple ideas’ that we have to explore. This aligns nicely with the methodology of scientific reasoning (and indeed “discovery”) that I’ve proposed in a couple of papers, ‘A New Definition of A Priori Knowledge: In Search of a Modal Basis‘ and ‘A Priori and A Posteriori: A Bootstrapping Relationship‘ in particular. In short, what Anderson describes as ‘imagination’ is what I consider to be a priori modelling of the space of metaphysically possible scenarios that could explain the data (the a posteriori basis) we currently have. Now, this is where the Higgs (mechanism) gets interesting, it’s a theoretical model that has now, after 50 years, been virtually confirmed with an enormous experimental effort. But I think it is a mistake to focus on the ‘discovery of the Higgs particle’. Instead, we should congratulate the teams at CERN about the confirmation of a possible explanation (a model) for one of the central questions in physics, not the discovery of a particle.

Physicists already knew that there must be something like the Higgs field which is responsible for the mass of things like W and Z bosons. They want to study the properties of this field, which can be done by finding and studying the corresponding Higgs particle. But: the Higgs field may not be elementary, it could be composed of several other fields, each of which would have a corresponding Higgs boson. So, we know of a number of possible combinations of particles and fields that would explain our current empirical data — and many of these options are still live.

In fact, even in the now unlikely event (less than one in a million) that the boson confirmed by the data were just a statistical fluctuation, or that something else is responsible for the observed deviations in the decay products, we could say something interesting. Whatever the arrangement of elementary fields and particles is, we do know that it manifests itself in such a way that we observe massive particles (that is, particles that have mass) like W and Z bosons. Hence, when we quantify over the Higgs boson by asking: ‘Does the Higgs boson exist?’, we are primarily interested in an explanation for previous data, that is, we want to understand the mechanism which is responsible for the emergence of massive particles. To this end, it makes little difference whether there exists such a thing as the Higgs boson. The experiments at the LHC are designed to reveal us something more about the nature of the Higgs field or fields, and we already know of the existence of something like the Higgs field(s). Now it seems very likely that at least one such field exists, and it’s the decay products of a boson corresponding to that field that ATLAS and CMS have been studying.

Philosophical analysis

Philosophically, perhaps the most interesting question is this: how do we know that the physicists are talking about the same thing when they debate the properties and the existence of the Higgs boson? There is certainly some common ground between the disputants, such as the Standard Model of quantum mechanics, but that is hardly sufficient to ensure that the disputants are indeed talking about the same thing, since the discovered boson may not even be the Standard Model Higgs (we will hopefully know in a couple of months). Building on Matt Strassler’s Higgs FAQ, here are the options (assuming that the announced results are not a mere statistical fluctuation):

  1. There is a Standard Model Higgs, with a mass of ~125 GeV.
  2. There is a Standard Model Higgs, but some other yet unknown particles and/or forces cause it to behave in unexpected ways, making it difficult to observe.
  3. There are several Higgs bosons, which are probably more difficult to observe than a Standard Model Higgs.
  4. There is no Standard Model Higgs boson, but rather something completely different: new particles and/or forces.

From what was announced today, there is no deciding between these options, but it seems that a lot of people are hoping for (1). I gather that (2) is unlikely, but it’s not impossible: the boson that we have discovered could turn out to be one of these unknown particles that mask the Standard Model Higgs. I don’t think that this is an option that will be seriously entertained from now on though, at least insofar as the properties of the discovered boson don’t turn out to be really strange. (3) is certainly a live option, as the observed boson may not be the Standard Model Higgs, in which case there could be other Higgs bosons that are difficult to observe. (4) is also live, but it appears that the discovered boson fits the Standard Model to such an extent that it must have some relevance to the Higgs mechanism, which would suggest that “something completely different” is unlikely.

Given the variety of options, how do we know that theoretical physicists are talking about the same thing when they talk about the Higgs boson? After all, there might be no Standard Model Higgs. There may even be several things. Or there might be some other phenomena responsible for the observed decay products. In fact, physicists might not even agree about what the options are — the list above is certainly simplified. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that even large portions of the Standard Model have to be abandoned. The philosophical upshot is that there is no clear sense of what enables us to determine whether the debate is even substantial. At the extreme end of the scale, it could be claimed that we simply do not know what it is that we are debating about. And I don’t think that this is an exception, it happens all over the place.

But clearly there is something substantial at issue here! Despite even fundamental disagreements about the background, physicists have been able to design experiments to test the various options. There must be something that is shared here. But it’s a mistake to think that it is the existence of something — something that we can quantify over with the existential quantifier — that has to be shared.

Let me venture a positive proposal: we know that the Higgs debate is substantial because we know what the Standard Model Higgs would be like if it were to exist, that is, we have a previous grasp of its nature or essence. This is what I take Philip Warren Anderson to have been hinting at. What does this previous grasp of essence entail? It entails that we have an idea as to what would explain the empirical data that we currently have. Among other things, we have already observed W and Z bosons and other heavy particles. It turns out that unless something like the Higgs field(s) is postulated, the Standard Model will have to be abandoned. So, the need to postulate the Higgs field(s), or the Higgs mechanism in its entirety, stems from the need to explain how elementary particles get their mass. The options listed above exhaust the logical space, or most of it at any rate, that fits the empirical data.

When the search for the Standard Model Higgs began, its possible mass range was fairly wide. The LHC ruled out chunks of it little by little, finally arriving at ~125GeV. But each of the specific masses in that original range were possible for the kind of thing that we are looking for. My suggestion is that we must know what kind of thing(s) would explain the data before we can ‘imagine’ possible models, like Anderson seems to think. It may turn out that it is a merely possible kind of thing, as it could for instance turn out that the Higgs field is not elementary and in fact consists of a number of other fields. But even in this case, we had a previous grasp of the natures or essences of the other possible kinds of things that would have explained the data, even though no such things exist. This story does not reflect a fundamental quantificational structure (contra Ted Sider’s suggestion in his Writing the Book of The World (2011, OUP)), it reflects a fundamental natural kind structure.

Well, there’s a lot more to say about all this, and especially about the process of scientific modelling via ‘imagination’, but I’ll leave that for a paper! I find the case of the Higgs to be a fascinating example of scientific modelling and the effort to verify these models has been impressive, but my reading of what the basis of scientific modelling is may seem controversial to many. I’ve used the Higgs as an example in many papers and talks and will certainly continue to do so; I’m encouraged by Anderson’s comments in particular. I think that a lot of the confusion surrounding the issue (and evident from the press conference questions, among other things) has to do exactly with the red herring of trying to identify with a single, quantifiable particle, THE Higgs boson, whereas we should really focus our attention on the wider explanatory effort and process of modelling itself.

Conference: Causation in Science – Temporality, Modality and Reduction, Norway

11 May
May 11, 2012

If you haven’t yet heard of CauSci, lead by Rani Lill Anjum, then this conference will serve to highlight the project. Looks great!

CauSci is pleased to announce our next international event, Causation in Science – Temporality, Modality and Reduction.

The workshop will take place at UMB on 3-5 September 2012.

See the list of titles and abstracts here: http://www.umb.no/causci/article/cauphy-program

More information will be posted on the webpage closer to the event about travel and accommodation. http://www.umb.no/causci/article/causation-in-physics

Registration is free and open to anyone. Please register by sending an e-mail to sigurd.tonnessen@uit.no within 1 August.

Speakers:

Mauricio Suárez, Complutense University Madrid and LSE, London
Iñaki San Pedro, Complutense University Madrid
Carl Hoefer, ICREA & Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona
Mauro Dorato, University of Rome 3
Ragnar Fjelland, SVT, University of Bergen
Stephen Mumford, University of Nottingham
Allen Stairs, University of Maryland
Sigurd Tønnessen, University of Tromsø
Johan Arnt Myrstad, University of Nordland, Bodø
Dagfinn Døhl Dybvig, University of Nordland, Bodø
Thor Sandmel, University of Oslo
Anita Leirfall, University of Bergen
Fredrik Andersen, Norwegian University of Life Sciences (UMB), Ås
Elias Núñez, Norwegian University of Life Sciences (UMB), Ås
Rani Lill Anjum, Norwegian University of Life Sciences (UMB), Ås

Background
The aim of the project Causation in Science is to develop a metaphysically plausible notion of causation that is also scientifically robust. It is hard to see how this can be achieved without considering some of the wider issues related to a realist notion of causation in modern physics. The following themes will be discussed at the workshop:

Causal realism
The concept of causation is controversial in physics. On the one hand, there is a view expressed by Bertrand Russell, and currently revived by Huw Price and others, that causation should have no place within an informed objective description of the world. On the other hand, many of the key notions employed by modern physics are characterised in dispositional terms, such as spin, charge, mass and radioactive decay. Causal dispositionalism suggests that this gives us at least some causation within physics.

Simultaneity
Quantum entanglement has been suggested by some as demonstrating that there can be simultaneous causation at a distance. Such causal non-locality, if it really is the case, would count against the spatial contiguity that Hume thought conceptually central to causation. Relativity theory, however, seems to imply that there cannot be simultaneity of cause and effect. If they are spatially distinct events, there is no sense in which they are simultaneous, and any causal influence between them must take time to travel. The description of simultaneity in physics thus seems to have philosophical implications for how to best understand causation with respect to locality.

Time and space
In modern physical theories there are various theories of space/time theories, some of which seem irreconcilable (for instance, standard Quantum Mechanics utilises absolute space/time while Quantum Field Theory utilises relative space/time). There are also diverging theories on the ontological nature of space/time ranging from illusion to physical object. What conclusions we should draw concerning simultaneity and causation will depend on how we understand the notions of space and time.

Modality
Another central issue is the kind of modality that is found in physics. Deterministic, indeterministic and probabilistic laws are usually linked to modal notions of necessity, randomness/pure contingency and probability. The modality of a tendency is more than pure contingency, yet short of necessity, and it does not carry any commitment to determinism or indeterminism. There might, however, be some irreducibly probabilistic tendencies. In virtue of what a law is supposed to be deterministic, indeterministic or probabilistic is thus something we need to make explicit. Another issue is how these modalities relate to predictability.

Reductionism, holism and emergence
Physics is often presented as the key, fundamental science to which all other sciences are supposed to reduce, be modelled, or at least relate. An open question is still whether there could be a role for holism and emergence within physics itself. If so, this would at least leave open the possibility for real emergence within other sciences.

Program: http://www.umb.no/causci/article/cauphy-program

Around the Blogosphere

20 Jan
January 20, 2011

I tend to bookmark some blog posts that I find interesting in the hopes that I’d some day get around to commenting on them on my own blog. Most of the time that doesn’t happen, or by the time I get around to it the posts are quite old. But that doesn’t mean that it wouldn’t be worthwhile to at least point them out, so what follows is a random collection of things that have caught my eye recently, or not so recently!

  • Bloggingheads.tv Science Saturday: Problems in Quantum Mechanics. This one is all the way from 2008, but I watched it maybe six months ago. With Sean Carroll and David Albert. It’s kind of introductory, but I at least found the stuff on the many-worlds interpretation quite helpful.
  • Certain Doubts How to Think about Infallibility, by Jon Kvanvig. As a thoroughgoing fallibilist who nevertheless thinks that there is a priori knowledge, infallibility is a topic that I’ve sometimes pondered. Kvanvig doesn’t deal with it quite in the manner that I would, but the modal approach discussed is interesting. I’m inclined to think that a search for Cartesian certainty is misguided though.
  • Maverick Philosopher Is It Rational to Fear Death? I think it’s healthy to think about death sometimes, but the reasoning in this post according to which the fear of death is irrational doesn’t quite seem right to me. It omits any discussion about the fear of losing one’s subject and claims simply that the fear of being nothing is irrational. On a related note, there is a conference coming up on this topic in Newcastle: Death: Its Meaning, Metaphysics, and Morality.
  • Entia et Nomina Rafal gives us a hint about a conference at Bydgoszcz, Poland, entitled Ontological Proofs Today, featuring E. J. Lowe, Richard Swinburne, and others.
  • the cookshop Finally something completely different: The Earth as a Floating Egg. The name of an album consisting of some strange soundscapes, drawing inspiration on ancient Finnish and Babylonian myths. I can’t remember where I found the link, but the blog in question looks like a promising place to find exceptional music…

BBC Radio 4: Is Philosophy Dead?

19 Dec
December 19, 2010

My sister pointed me towards this BBC Radio 4 podcast in The Infinite Monkey Cage series (Mon 6th December 2010 edition). It seems to have been prompted by Stephen Hawking’s comments to the effect that philosophy is dead in his recent book. A rather superficial discussion, although Julian Baggini and Raymond Tallis clarify some of the more obvious errors. The discussion is not helped by Brian Cox’s apparent ignorance of philosophy. I find him just as irritating as I did in the BBC TV series Wonders of the Solar System. Anyway, although I haven’t read Hawking’s book, I doubt that his case for the death of philosophy is particularly well-developed. Fortunately, Philip Goff has already pointed out Hawking’s philosophical shortcomings in Guardian, although the comment concerns a slightly different matter.

Cox for instance defines ‘consciousness’ in terms of the Turing Test (around the 16min mark), i.e. he says that a computer passing the Turing Test would be conscious. This is just silly, as the philosophers are quickly to point out: my PC would no doubt pass the Turing Test given appropriate software. This is a typical problem in popular philosophy discussions; the non-philosopher discussants may think that they have a grasp on contemporary philosophical work, but in fact they are, for obvious reasons, quite ignorant about any recent developments. The Turing Test is covered in any undergraduate philosophy of mind module and none of my students at Durham, to whom I taught strong and weak AI and so on, would make a claim as naive as Brian Cox’s…

Philosophy and the Ivory Tower

18 Sep
September 18, 2010

Nigel Warburton and James Ladyman discuss the prospects of popularizing philosophy here (a BBC article and BBC Radio 4 clip). Nothing particularly surprising there — Warburton, who is behind the Philosophy Bites podcasts and is publishing a related book is very optimistic about making philosophy intelligible for the layman, whereas Ladyman, whose work is primarily on rather technical aspects of philosophy of physics and mathematics is less optimistic, but acknowledges the general point that we can, and should, make philosophy accessible as far as it can be done with reasonable effort.

I do like to see these popular philosophy titles being released and discussion about philosophy in the public is a good thing in principle, but it tends to be overwhelmed with ethics and philosophy of politics, i.e., the kind of stuff that is much more accessible to begin with. You don’t see much philosophy of physics, or metaphysics for that matter, being discussed in the public realm. The problem, I think, is that the basic terminology which is necessary for explaining some ideas in metaphysics for instance is not known to the layman, whereas explaining an idea in, say, ethics would not require that much technical jargon. That’s not to say that metaphysics couldn’t be made accessible, but it would require some more patience from the public. I guess the best way to explain some of these ideas would be to use some simple thought experiments or simple scientific examples. You’d end up with simplifications, but then again that’s what you end up with in the case of popular science as well. For instance, I recently watched the BBC Wonders of the Solar System series, all five hours of it, but even with my modest knowledge of physics and astronomy it turned out to be a waste of time: there was perhaps half an hour of material that was actually new or interesting for me. Anyway, if you simplify philosophy to a similar extent, you could quite easily come up with something that’s accessible to the layman. Whether or not it would actually help them to understand philosophy and its importance is another question.

That brings me to the risk that I see in this: watered-down presentations of science and philosophy alike often misrepresent the nature of the discipline. The risk is greater in philosophy, since the layman might not think that there is much value in philosophy to begin with, whereas with science there are often applications that are already familiar to the public.