Research
My primary research interests are in contemporary analytic metaphysics and the methodology of metaphysics, especially a priori knowledge, modality, and essences, but I also have research interests in philosophical logic, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science.
Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics (CUP, 2012)
In my Ph.D. thesis, The Necessity of Metaphysics (1Mb PDF), I argue for a realist, Aristotelian understanding of metaphysics and defend the role of metaphysics in contemporary analytic philosophy. The central themes of the thesis concern a priori knowledge, modality, and essence.
I am currently working on a book provisionally entitled A Study of the Foundations of Metaphysics: Apriority, Modality, and Essence, which develops the main themes of my PhD thesis. I am also the editor of Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics (Cambridge University Press, 2012). The volume brings together leading philosophers working in or at least sympathetic to what could be called ‘Aristotelian metaphysics’, that is, metaphysics conceived in a realist fashion, as the ‘first philosophy’. The volume has been reviewed in NDPR by Robert C. Koons.
Published Work
Journal Articles Erkenntnis, Forthcoming. doi:10.1007/s10670-012-9428-x. One type of deflationism about metaphysical modality suggests that it can be analysed strictly in terms of linguistic or conceptual content and that there is nothing particularly metaphysical about modality. Scott Soames is explicitly opposed to this trend. However, a detailed study of Soames’s own account of modality reveals that it has striking similarities with the deflationary account. In this paper I will compare Soames’s account of a posteriori necessities concerning natural kinds with the deflationary one, specifically Alan Sidelle’s account, and suggest that Soames’s account is vulnerable to the deflatonist’s critique. Furthermore, I conjecture that both the deflationary account and Soames’s account fail to fully explicate the metaphysical content of a posteriori necessities. Although I will focus on Soames, my argument may have more general implications towards the prospects of providing a meaning-based account of metaphysical modality. Ratio, Vol. 25, No. 4, 405-424, 2012. Special Issue on Classifying Reality, edited by David S. Oderberg. To be reprinted in David S. Oderberg (Ed.), Classifying Reality (Wiley-Blackwell). doi:10.1111/j.1467-9329.2012.00554.x. This paper defends the idea that there must be some joints in reality, some correct way to classify or categorize it. This may seem obvious, but we will see that there are at least three conventionalist arguments against this idea, as well as philosophers who have found them convincing. The thrust of these arguments is that the manner in which we structure, divide or carve up the world is not grounded in any natural, genuine boundaries in the world. Ultimately they are supposed to pose a serious threat to realism. The first argument that will be examined concerns the claim that there are no natural boundaries in reality, the second one focuses on the basis of our classificatory schemes, which the conventionalist claims to be merely psychological, and the third considers the significance of our particular features in carving up the world, such as physical size and perceptual capabilities. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that none of these objections succeed in undermining the existence of genuine joints in reality. Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. 86, 2012. What is our epistemic access to metaphysical modality? Timothy Williamson suggests that the epistemology of counterfactuals will provide the answer. This paper challenges Williamson’s account and argues that certain elements of the epistemology of counterfactuals that he discusses, namely so called background knowledge and constitutive facts, are already saturated with modal content which his account fails to explain. Williamson’s account will first be outlined and the role of background knowledge and constitutive facts analysed. Their key role is to restrict our imagination to rule out irrelevant counterfactual suppositions. However, background knowledge turns out to be problematic in cases where we are dealing with metaphysically possible counterfactual suppositions that violate the actual laws of physics. As we will see, unless Williamson assumes that background knowledge corresponds with the actual, true laws of physics and that these laws are metaphysically necessary, it will be difficult to address this problem. Furthermore, Williamson’s account fails to accommodate the distinction between conceivable yet metaphysically impossible scenarios, and conceivable and metaphysically possible scenarios. This is because background knowledge and constitutive facts are based strictly on our knowledge of the actual world. Williamson does attempt to address this concern with regard to metaphysical necessities – as they hold across all possible worlds – but we will see that even in this case the explanation is questionable. These problems, it will be suggested, cannot be addressed in a counterfactual account of the epistemology of modality. The paper finishes with an analysis of Williamson’s possible rejoinders and some discussion about the prospects of an alternative account of modal epistemology. Metaphysica, Vol. 12, No. 2, 151-164, 2011. doi:10.1007/s12133-011-0083-5. The distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge has been the subject of an enormous amount of discussion, but the literature is biased against recognizing the intimate relationship between these forms of knowledge. For instance, it seems to be almost impossible to find a sample of pure a priori or a posteriori knowledge. In this paper, it will be suggested that distinguishing between a priori and a posteriori is more problematic than is often suggested, and that a priori and a posteriori resources are in fact used in parallel. We will define this relationship between a priori and a posteriori knowledge as the bootstrapping relationship. As we will see, this relationship gives us reasons to seek for an altogether novel definition of a priori and a posteriori knowledge. Specifically, we will have to analyse the relationship between a priori knowledge and a priori reasoning, and it will be suggested that the latter serves as a more promising starting point for the analysis of aprioricity. We will also analyse a number of examples from the natural sciences and consider the role of a priori reasoning in these examples. The focus of this paper is the analysis of the concepts of a priori and a posteriori knowledge rather than the epistemic domain of a posteriori and a priori justification. Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 75, No. 2, pp. 344–357, 2009. doi:10.1111/j.1755-2567.2009.01048.x. This paper challenges the Kripkean interpretation of a posteriori necessities. It will be demonstrated, by an analysis of classic examples, that the modal content of supposed a posteriori necessities is more complicated than the Kripkean line suggests. We will see that further research is needed concerning the a priori principles underlying all a posteriori necessities. In the course of this analysis it will emerge that the modal content of a posteriori necessities can be best described in terms of a Finean conception of modality – by giving essences priority over modality. The upshot of this is that we might be able to establish the necessity of certain supposed a posteriori necessities by a priori means. The Australasian Journal of Logic, Vol. 7, pp. 32-47, 2009. The original publication is available at the journal’s website. The goals of this paper are two-fold: I wish to clarify the Aristotelian conception of the law of non-contradiction as a metaphysical rather than a semantic or logical principle, and to defend the truth of the principle in this sense. First I will explain what it in fact means that the law of non-contradiction is a metaphysical principle. The core idea is that the law of non-contradiction is a general principle derived from how things are in the world. For example, there are certain constraints as to what kind of properties an object can have, and especially: some of these properties are mutually exclusive. Given this characterisation, I will advance to examine what kind of challenges the law of noncontradiction faces—the main opponent here is Graham Priest. I will consider these challenges and conclude that they do not threaten the truth of the law of noncontradiction understood as a metaphysical principle. Philosophia, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 335-40, 2009. doi:10.1007/s11406-008-9172-2. In this paper I offer a counterexample to the so called vagueness argument against restricted composition. This will be done in the lines of a recent suggestion by Trenton Merricks, namely by challenging the claim that there cannot be a sharp cut-off point in a composition sequence. It will be suggested that causal powers which emerge when composition occurs can serve as an indicator of such sharp cut-off points. The main example will be the case of a heap. It seems that heaps might provide a very plausible counterexample to the vagueness argument if we accept the idea that four grains of sand is the least number required to compose a heap—the case has been supported by W. D. Hart. My purpose here is not to put forward a new theory of composition, I only wish to refute the vagueness argument and point out that we should be wary of arguments of its form. Metaphysica, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 57-68, 2008. doi:10.1007/s12133-007-0022-7. In this paper I will offer a novel understanding of a priori knowledge. My claim is that the sharp distinction that is usually made between a priori and a posteriori knowledge is groundless. It will be argued that a plausible understanding of a priori and a posteriori knowledge has to acknowledge that they are in a constant bootstrapping relationship. It is also crucial that we distinguish between a priori propositions that hold in the actualworld and merely possible, non-actual a priori propositions, as we will see when considering cases like Euclidean geometry. Furthermore, contrary to what Kripke seems to suggest, a priori knowledge is intimately connected with metaphysical modality, indeed, grounded in it. The task of a priori reasoning, according to this account, is to delimit the space of metaphysically possible worlds in order for us to be able to determine what is actual.
Book Chapters In Edward Feser (Ed.), Aristotle on Method and Metaphysics, Philosophers in Depth series (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), Forthcoming. Aristotle talks about ‘the first philosophy’ throughout the Metaphysics – and it is metaphysics that Aristotle considers to be the first philosophy – but he never makes it entirely clear what first philosophy consists of. What he does make clear is that the first philosophy is not to be understood as a collection of topics that should be studied in advance of any other topics. In fact, Aristotle seems to have thought that the topics of Metaphysics are to be studied after those in Physics. In what sense could metaphysics be the first philosophy in the context of contemporary metaphysics? This is the question examined in this essay. Contemporary topics such as fundamentality, grounding, and ontological dependence are considered as possible ways to understand the idea of first philosophy, but I will argue that the best way to understand it is in terms of essence. In Tuomas E. Tahko (ed.), Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2012. The original publication is available at the publisher’s website. This is the introduction to my Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics. In Tuomas E. Tahko (ed.), Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2012. The original publication is available at the publisher’s website. When I say that my conception of metaphysics is Aristotelian, or neo-Aristotelian, this may have more to do with Aristotle’s philosophical methodology than his metaphysics, but, as I see it, the core of this Aristotelian conception of metaphysics is the idea that metaphysics is the first philosophy . In what follows I will attempt to clarify what this conception of metaphysics amounts to in the context of some recent discussion on the methodology of metaphysics (e.g. Chalmers et al . (2009), Ladyman and Ross (2007)). There is a lot of hostility towards the Aristotelian conception of metaphysics in this literature: for instance, the majority of the contributors to the Metametaphysics volume assume a rather more deflationary, Quinean approach towards metaphysics. In the process of replying to the criticisms towards Aristotelian metaphysics put forward in recent literature I will also identify some methodological points which deserve more attention and ought to be addressed in future research. (With Donnchadh O’Conaill) In Philip Goff (Ed.) Spinoza on Monism, Philosophers in Depth series (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 2011. The volume is available here. The priority monist holds that the cosmos is the only fundamental object, of which every other concrete object is a dependent part. One major argument against monism goes back to Russell, who claimed that pluralism is favoured by common sense. However, Jonathan Schaffer turns this argument on its head and uses it to defend priority monism. He suggests that common sense holds that the cosmos is a whole, of which ordinary physical objects are arbitrary portions, and that arbitrary portions depend for their existence on the existence of the whole. In this paper, we challenge Schaffer’s claim that the parts of the cosmos are all arbitrary portions. We suggest that there is a way of carving up the universe such that at least some of its parts are not arbitrary. We offer two arguments in support of this claim. First, we shall outline semantic reasons in its favour: in order to accept that empirical judgements are made true or false by the way the world is, one must accept that the cosmos includes parts whose existence is not arbitrary. Second, we offer an ontological argument: in order for macro-physical phenomena to exist, there must be some micro-physical order which they depend upon, and this order must itself be non-arbitrary. We conclude that Schaffer’s common sense argument for monism cannot be made to work. In Dale Jacquette (Ed.) Cannabis and Philosophy: What Were We Just Talking About? (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell), pp. 149-161, 2010. The volume is available here. This paper is a survey of the positive and negative aspects of cannabis use from the point of view of the individual on the one hand and from the point of view of the society on the other hand. Health, social, and political motives are all discussed, and the best method of harm reduction is analysed. The upshot is that zero tolerance policy is obsolete, and that there are reasons to think that many individuals would be better off using cannabis rather than other drugs. In Michal Peliš (Ed.) The Logica Yearbook 2007 (Prague: Filosofia), pp. 225-235, 2008. The volume is available here. The purpose of this paper is to examine the status of logic from a metaphysical point of view – what is logic grounded in and what is its relationship with metaphysics. There are three general lines that we can take. 1) Logic and metaphysics are not continuous, neither discipline has no bearing on the other one. This seems to be a rather popular approach, at least implicitly, as philosophers often skip the question altogether and go about their business, be it logic or metaphysics. However, it is not a particularly plausible view and it is very hard to maintain consistently, as we will see. 2) Logic is prior to metaphysics and has metaphysical implications. The extreme example of this kind of approach is the Dummettian one, according to which metaphysical questions are reducible to the question of which logic to adopt. 3) Metaphysics is prior to logic, and your logic should be compatible with your metaphysics. This approach suggests an answer to the question of what logic is grounded in, namely, metaphysics. Here I will defend the third option. In Patricia Hanna (Ed.), An Anthology of Philosophical Studies (Athens: ATINER), pp. 53-63, 2008. The volume is available here. In this paper I examine what exactly is ‘Aristotelian metaphysics’. My inquiry into Aristotelian metaphysics should not be understood to be so much concerned with the details of Aristotle’s metaphysics. I am are rather concerned with his methodology of metaphysics, although a lot of the details of his metaphysics survive in contemporary discussion as well. This warrants an investigation into the methodological aspects of Aristotle’s metaphysics. The key works that we will be looking at are his Physics, Metaphysics, Categories and De Interpretatione. Perhaps the most crucial features of the Aristotelian method of philosophising are the relationship between science and metaphysics, and his defence of the principle of non-contradiction (PNC). For Aristotle, natural science is the second philosophy, but this is so only because there is something more fundamental in the world, something that natural science – a science of movement – cannot study. Furthermore, Aristotle demonstrates that metaphysics enters the picture at a fundamental level, as he argues that PNC is a metaphysical rather than a logical principle. The upshot of all this is that the Aristotelian method and his metaphysics are not threatened by modern science, quite the opposite. Moreover, we have in our hands a methodology which is very rigorous indeed and worthwhile for any metaphysician to have a closer look at.
Commentaries and Reviews The Philosophical Quarterly, 63 (251): 379-382, 2013. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.2005. Review of Ehring, Douglas, Tropes: Properties, Objects and Mental Causation (Oxford University Press, 2011). Mind, 2012. doi:10.1093/mind/fzt020. Review of Lowe, E. J., More Kinds of Being: A Further Study of Individuation, Identity, and the Logic of Sortal Terms (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009). Humana.Mente, Vol. 19, 197-204, 2011. The original publication is available at the journal’s website. This is a critical commentary on Kathrin Koslicki’s book, The Structure of Objects (Oxford University Press, 2008).
Work in Progress
Recent work on Natural Kind Essentialism has taken a deflationary turn: biological and chemical kinds in particular have come under scrutiny. The assumptions about the grounds of essentialist truths concerning natural kinds familiar from the Kripke-Putnam framework are now considered questionable. The source of the problem, however, has not been sufficiently explicated. I will focus on the Twin Earth scenarios and demonstrate that the essentialist principle at its core (which I call IDENT), namely that necessarily, chemical substance A is identical with chemical substance B if and only if A and B have the same molecular composition, must be re-evaluated. The Twin Earth scenarios also assume the falsity of another essentialist principle (which I call INST): necessarily, only the actual molecular composition of any chemical substance can produce the chemical properties of that substance. I will call this assumption into question and argue that, in fact, the best strategy for defending IDENT is to establish INST. I will then assess the prospects for Natural Kind Essentialism and microstructural essentialism regarding chemical substances, with reference to recent work in the philosophy of chemistry. A weakened form of INST will be presented and defended.
Our epistemic access to essence is a topic which has received very little attention. This is partly due to confusion surrounding the notion of essence itself, and partly due to the sheer difficulty of coming up with a plausible account. The starting point of this paper is an Aristotelian conception of essence, familiar from the work of Kit Fine, E. J. Lowe, David S. Oderberg, and others, i.e., essence is ontologically prior to modality. I introduce four options regarding our epistemic access to essence. These fall in two groups: we could gain knowledge about essence either directly, or via modal knowledge. Furthermore, each of these routes to essence could be either a priori or a posteriori (or a combination of the two). The advantages and disadvantages of each approach will be analysed, and I will ultimately defend the view according to which our epistemic access to essence is via our a priori knowledge of metaphysical modality.
This paper concerns the puzzle about the existence of a fundamental level of reality. While it will be argued that there are some good reasons to think that there is a fundamental level, the primary contribution of the paper is methodological: the ‘levels’ metaphor, the meaning of ‘fundamental’, our means to inquire into the existence of a fundamental level, and the prospects of determining the nature of this level will all be discussed. Two ways to understand fundamentality – in mereological and ideological terms – will be discussed, and the role of ontological dependence, grounding, and well-foundedness examined. A provisional argument to the effect that there is a fundamental level will be presented. Input from physics in our search for a fundamental level will also be analysed, and it will emerge that a study of fundamental physical constants, such as the fine structure constant, and of certain physical principles, such as the Pauli Exclusion Principle, are of particular interest.
In this paper I examine whether a conception of apriority regarding geometry that considers it to be empirically indefeasible can be maintained. Most contemporary accounts take a priori justification to be empirically defeasible. I approach the topic via a re-evaluation of the status of alternative geometries. Specifically, I argue that Euclidean geometry is still justified a priori. However, this requires a change in our conception of apriority. My suggestion concerns the relationship between the apriority and the truth of a proposition. By drawing an analogy between pure and applied geometry on one hand and between truth in a model and truth in the world on the other hand, we can understand apriority regarding geometry in such a way that empirical indefeasibility can be maintained, and the challenge raised by the case of Euclidean geometry addressed.
Recent literature suggests that truthmaking is not compatible just with realism, but also with pragmatism and idealism, and thus does not help in defending realism in general. I take this point and show that in fact the wider applicability of the truthmaker principle only strengthens the realist’s case, for all that is needed is a plausible way to account for our realist intuitions concerning truth. It will be demonstrated that to motivate truthmaking, we only need a weakened understanding of the truthmaker principle. All this is grist to the realist’s mill, as one influential challenge for realism, in the lines of Hilary Putnam, Michael Dummett and Nelson Goodman, is its inability to put forward a plausible theory of truth. This objection can now be easily refuted: the truthmaker principle, widely conceived, is just the missing piece – its applicability beyond realist ontologies only increases its plausibility.
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