Tag Archive for: grounding

Workshop: Aristotelian Themes in Dependence, Modality, and Essence, Helsinki

30 Dec
December 30, 2012

Bringing to front from December 2012

I’m excited to announce this workshop at the University of Helsinki, bringing together Aristotle scholars and contemporary metaphysicians on a number of important themes in Aristotelian metaphysics. I’m organizing this with my colleague and Aristotle scholar Mika Perälä. A poster (free to distribute) is available here.

Aristotelian Themes in Dependence, Modality, and Essence

Workshop at the University of Helsinki
Saturday, January 26th 2013

Location: University of Helsinki Main Building, Fabianinkatu 33, room 8

Program
09:00 – 10:30 Lucas Angioni (Campinas, Brazil), ‘Essence, Causality and Necessity in Aristotle’s Theory of Scientific Explanation’
10:40 – 12:10 Michail Peramatzis (Oxford), ‘Essence and Necessity in Aristotle’
12:10 – 13:10 Lunch
13:10 – 14:40 Tuomas Tahko (Helsinki), ‘Grounding Modality in Essence’
14:50 – 16:20 Benjamin Schnieder (Hamburg), ‘Grounding and Dependence’
16:30 – 18:00 Mika Perälä (Helsinki), ‘Aristotle on ouk aneu Dependence’

Attendance is free, but we would kindly ask you to e-mail either Mika Perälä (mika.perala@helsinki.fi) or Tuomas Tahko (tuomas.tahko@helsinki.fi) if you are planning to attend. Some of the papers will be available for pre-reading, please contact Mika or Tuomas for further details.

The workshop is organized by Dr. Mika Perälä and Dr. Tuomas Tahko and is funded by Mika Perälä’s Academy of Finland project Aristotle on Memory and the Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art Studies, University of Helsinki.

UNC-Chapel Hill Diaries #7

29 Mar
March 29, 2012

Previous entires: #1, #2, #3, #4, #5, #6.

In Durham, they sell metaphysics by the pound. (Ninth Street)

In Durham, they sell metaphysics by the pound. (Ninth Street)

Firstly, I’ve got another batch of talks coming up. First of them is tomorrow, Friday March 30 at Duke University (3:30pm, West Duke 202) in the colloquium series. I’ll be talking about ‘Quantification and Ontological Realism’. The talk will be followed by a reception, so stick around if you’re attending. I’m looking forward to this one, as I think I’ve got a nice paper. It’s mainly a critique of Ted Sider’s recent defence of fundamental, perfectly joint-carving quantification in his Writing the Book of the World (OUP, 2011). It’s nice to go to Durham too, since they have a “Metaphysical Shop” and all (see the photo)… Ninth Street, which is relatively close to the campus, has a very nice selection of shops and cafes.

Already on the following Wednesday, April 4, I’ll be talking at Boulder, Colorado (3:30pm, HLMS 141) with the title ‘(Neo-)Aristotelian Essentialism’. I’ll be in Boulder April 3-5.

Other than that, I haven’t got much in terms of news. I pretty much missed the whole of last week being ill with a flu. Fortunately it only hit me after the party that I organized with Elizabeth at our place. The party went well, although the turnout could’ve been better — we’re a little bit out of the way and not that many people know me yet. It was fun anyway, with a good mix of Chapel Hill faculty and graduate students. We also had someone from another college in North Carolina, whom I knew from a conference. Oh, and Peter van Inwagen showed up too, which was nice! Unfortunately I don’t have any photographic evidence of the gathering, as I was too busy entertaining guests. I particularly regret not snapping a photo of the all-vegan buffet feast that we prepared with Elizabeth. A list will have to suffice: vegan sushi, seitan-tomato-onion skewers in jerk marinade, seitan-pineapple skewers in lime marinade with lime and cilantro dip, olive-walnut rolls, green salad with vinaigrette, hummus tray with veggies, olives, gingerbread cookies, and a chocolate-cherry cake. We made everything from scratch (except the hummus), so it was a fair bit of work! But very enjoyable, and people seemed to like the food too.

Cardinals are quite common here

Cardinals are quite common here

I ended up missing talks by Ned Markosian and Jonathan Schaffer at Duke last week because of the illness. Fortunately I managed to catch Schaffer at Chapel Hill. He gave a talk on ‘Structural Equation Models of Metaphysical Structure’ — not a very informative title. Effectively he revised his story about grounding a bit and suggested that it’s best understood as analogous to causation, or as “metaphysical causation”. I wasn’t convinced, but I won’t go into the details as I wasn’t able to follow the talk that well in my tired post-flu state. I might get my hands on a draft of this paper though (for the metaphysics reading group), in which case I’ll perhaps report in more detail.

Unsurprisingly, my running has suffered a big blow in March: I’ve missed two full weeks of training, with a half decent week in between. I’m back at it now, but still not up to full health. I’m running the Tar Heel 10-miler on April 21, so I’ve got another three weeks or so to get back into racing shape. Did I mention that I’m gaining weight from all the tasty craft beer and cooking and Elizabeth’s baking and… Well, maybe some of it is muscle from the gym work, who knows.

Deer, from our kitchen window

Deer, from our kitchen window

It’s effectively summer here now. Spring came and went with the cherry blossoms, and we even had a sweltering day of +31 Celsius not long ago. It’s nice and green everywhere. I hope to do a photography walk soon to capture some of that green stuff. The nights are warm enough to sit outside gazing the stars. Wildlife is still active too. There was some kind of an eagle on our backyard last week; I tried to photograph it but couldn’t get close enough to get a nice focus. Instead I managed to capture the Cardinal that you can see above, although it’s not the best shot — I’d really need a decent zoom lens for these birds. We also have woodpeckers visiting frequently, but they’re rather shy birds. I still haven’t gotten a better shot of the deer either, so I’m attaching one of my older shots of a couple that were hanging out around our house.

"Caribe", at Sage Café

"Caribe", at Sage Café

We haven’t been out in Chapel Hill or around much recently, but we did make another trip to Sage Café — a nice vegetarian restaurant quite close to our place. You can get almost everything vegan as well. This time I remembered to bring my camera and snapped a photo of my dish, Caribe — Caribbean style black beans topped with a slice of avocado, served with rice, grilled spicy tofu & plaintains. It’s not the cheapest place, but the food is quite tasty.

I’ll report back after Boulder, I think. A friend of mine from Finland is coming to visit right after though, and we’re planning to do a week’s road trip, so I’ll be away for a bit.

Summer School: Metaphysical Mayhem, Rutgers

06 Feb
February 6, 2012

This is a great opportunity for graduate students interested in hot topics in contemporary analytic metaphysics, Hosted by Rutgers University, taking place this May, and featuring some leading names in metaphysics!

Details copied from the Metaphysical Mayhem website.

Metaphysical Mayhem is back! Rutgers University will be hosting a 5-day summer school for graduate students May 14-18, 2012. John Hawthorne, Katherine Hawley, Ted Sider, Jonathan Schaffer, and Dean Zimmerman will lead the seminars on a variety of topics in metaphysics, including: natural properties, composition as identity, grounding, metaphysical explanation, and stuff like that…

We want the sessions to retain the dynamic of a graduate a seminar, and the seminar room is not large, so space is limited. Approximately ten graduate students from graduate programs outside the New York City/New Jersey area will be provided with room and board for the duration of the conference, hosted by Rutgers graduate students (in their homes or apartments). Subventions for travel may also be available. To apply for one of these ten slots, students should send an e-mail to Matthew Benton at mbenton@philosophy.rutgers.edu with the following attachments:

1. A brief (300-500 word) description of one’s interests in metaphysics.
2. CV
3. Unofficial transcript
4. A paper on any topic in Metaphysics

In addition, we ask that a professor familiar with the student’s work submit a very brief letter of recommendation (not more than a paragraph) to the same e-mail address (applicants should mention their references in the application e-mail).
The remainder of the participants in the seminar will be chosen from graduate students at Rutgers and at programs in the greater NYC/NJ area. Non-Rutgers students from local graduate programs should send the five items listed above to Matthew Benton, along with the name of a faculty member in his or her department willing to serve as a reference.

Lunch will be provided for all participants. Graduate students from NYC/NJ area schools will be responsible for their own accommodations and for most evening meals.

The deadline for applications is February 24, and participants will be chosen by March 9.

A Talk at Reed College, Portland

21 Sep
September 21, 2011

I’m heading to Seattle in about a week’s time and will be in the area until October 11. The purpose of the visit is non-academic, but I thought I might as well offer to give a talk at one of the Universities in the area. It was a bit of a late notice, but the Philosophy Department at Reed College, Portland, has agreed to host me. So, I will give a talk at Reed on October 7, 4.15pm. The title of the talk is the same as my recent talk in Milan at ECAP 7, i.e. ‘Grounding Modality’ (click for an abstract). However, I’ve made some revisions to the paper since Milan, and I should be able to give the full talk this time! I look forward to visiting Portland as well, I’ve heard good things about it.

I’m also planning to visit Vancouver while I’m in the area, and probably do some hiking in the Olympic Mountains.

Grounding Modality

16 Sep
September 16, 2011

I gave a talk with the above title at the ECAP 7 conference in Milan two weeks ago. Several people were interested in the paper, and as I’ve now had the chance to make some minor revisions to it, I thought I’d post the draft here. I’m not entirely happy with the paper yet, but at this point it might be useful to get some feedback, so I turn to you, my dear readers.

The paper discusses the relationship between essence and modality in a Finean context. Like Kit Fine has argued, I take it that metaphysical modality reduces, or is grounded in, essence. I do not defend or comment on Fine’s arguments to this effect though, rather, I develop on this idea and attempt to clarify how modality can be understood in terms of essence. In the Finean account, a crucial part of this understanding is the grounding relation, which is manifested via the ‘is true in virtue of the nature of…’ predicate, e.g. metaphysically necessary propositions are true in virtue of the natures of all things (as opposed to some proper subset of all things). It is this predicate that I am interested in.

Although the account that I will suggest is sympathetic to the Finean picture, I consider there to be one serious caveat in the Finean account: there is no reliable method which would enable us to distinguish between what could be called genuine metaphysical possibilities and metaphysical impossibilities, or, as I call the latter, pseudo-possibilities — that is, metaphysically impossible yet conceptually or logically possible worlds, such as worlds in which gold is not an element, cats are not animals, water is XYZ instead of H2O, and so on. I propose that we have to introduce a stricter understanding of the relationship between essence and modality to rule out pseudo-possibilities altogether. My account has one significant cost though: it requires abadoning the duality of possibility and necessity, i.e. it is not the case that p is possible iff not-p is not necessary, and it is not the case that p is necessary iff not-p is not possible. I also suggest that we should define different kinds of possibility and necessity not in terms of the Finean ‘is true in virtue of the nature of…’ predicate, but in terms of two different predicates — one for possibility and one for necessity — that latch on to what makes a certain proposition possible or necessary, rather than what makes it true:

MET: p is metaphysically necessary (possible) iff p is necessary (possible) in virtue of the nature(s) of the (concrete, non-conceptual) entities relevant to p.

CON: p is conceptually necessary (possible) iff p is necessary (possible) in virtue of the nature(s) of the (abstract) concepts relevant to p.

LOG: p is logically necessary (possible) iff p is necessary (possible) in virtue of the nature(s) of the (abstract, non-conceptual) logical entities relevant to p.

Defining necessity and possibility in terms of what is ‘relevant’ for the proposition in question requires further explanation. The idea is that p is metaphysically necessary only in virtue of the particular nature or natures of the entities that are actively involved in making p necessary. What I mean by active involvement is that particular features of the essence of a given object give raise to the modal constraints that it manifests; this serves to distinguish genuine modalities from the supposed modal truths that emerge only passively, namely via the lack of modal constraints. Modal truths that emerge passively are, due to the manner of their introduction, (pseudo-)possibilities: for instance, if a given scenario is not contradictory, i.e. it is not ruled out by conceptual or logical analysis, then it is generally judged to be possible.

In the full paper I go on to analyze different kinds of modality and demonstrate how they can be accommodated in the proposed account in such a way that pseudo-possibilities can be ruled out.

Comments are most welcome! I know it’s a bit of a crazy view, but I’m keen to see how far I can take it.