Tag Archive for: metaphysics of science

Postdoc in Metaphysics of Science, Paris

11 Jan
January 11, 2013

This postdoc in Paris should be of interest to any scientifically inclined metaphysican. I’d probably be applying myself if I didn’t have other commitments! Deadline February 15.

A postdoctoral position will be available at IHPST (Institut d’Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques, Paris) within the French ANR funded project “Metaphysics of Science”, for one year (September/October 2013 – August/September 2014), renewable for a second year (September/October 2014 – August/September 2015).
The successful candidate must pursue research, and already have some expertise, in at least one of the three domains in the focus of the project: 1) Levels of reality, 2) Individual objects in physics and biology, and 3) Dispositions in psychology and physics.

The post-doc will be expected to present his/her research at conferences and seminars, and to publish in peer-reviewed journals.

He or she will work at IHPST in Paris and will provide organizational support for the activities of the teams. Residence in Paris is strictly mandatory.

Major tasks will be to:
1) run the Metaphysics of Science seminar on a regular basis,
2) help organize the workshops of the research project,
3) create and maintain a website on the metaphysics of experimental sciences, which will provide tools of cooperation within the team and help disseminate the results of our research,
4) constitute a database on metaphysics of science.

Applicants must have a doctorate in philosophy. Knowledge of French is not required, but fluency in English is.

Salary will be approximately 2000 € net (2500 € gross) per month.

Application material:
-A cover letter addressed to Max Kistler, Metascience coordinator
-A CV with a list of publications
-A writing sample (e.g., a publication or a dissertation chapter)
-Three letters of recommendation
-A statement of research agenda that fits into one of the areas of the project (2-3 pages)

Applications should be submitted electronically, in a single PDF file, to:
Max Kistler: mkistler@univ-paris1.fr

Deadline for submission of application: 15 February 2013.

Candidates will be informed of the decision by 31 March 2013.

For further information, please contact Max Kistler.

On the Modal Status of Laws

17 Nov
November 17, 2012

The modal status of the laws of nature is a topic that I come across frequently, but on which I haven’t really formed a solid opinion on. This ought to change, as they play an important role on a number of arguments and views that I’m interested in (for some recent discussion, see my ‘Counterfactuals and Modal Epistemology‘). Recently I’ve been thinking about the topic a little more and I just went back to an old draft about laws and Humean Supervenience. A possible view occurred to me while I was revising the paper and I’m now trying figure out if it’s feasible.

As I see it, there are three popular views about laws: the Humean Supervenience (HS) approach due to David Lewis’s work, the nomic necessitation approach primarily familiar from David Armstrong’s work, and the scientific/dispositional essentialist approach defended for instance by Brian Ellis and Alexander Bird. All of these views come in many varieties and there are also alternative approaches such as Stephen Mumford’s lawlessness approach and E. J. Lowe’s essentialist approach. Of these, I find myself closest to Lowe, since it is the only view that can accommodate variation in the modal status of laws, that is, Lowe’s view is compatible with the necessity of some laws and the contingency of some other laws. Note that I am here interested in metaphysical modality. Both HS and the nomic necessitation approach consider all laws to be contingent in the metaphysical sense, whereas scientific/dispositional essentialism generally hold all laws to be metaphysically necessary. But Lowe thinks that only some laws are metaphysically necessary, and his case to this effect builds on connecting laws and natural kinds:

What I can say […] is that the uniformities in question [concerning the powers and liabilities of electrons] are explained by the fact that electrons are all particular instances of the same fundamental natural kind, which is governed by a number of laws linking this kind with certain attributes. And I can explain the absence of other regularly occurring combinations of powers and liabilities in terms of the non-existence of any kinds of particle governed by suitable laws.

(Lowe, The Four-Category Ontology, OUP 2006, p. 161.)

I sympathise with the general line of thought, but it seems to me that Lowe’s view struggles with some typical examples of laws, such as Coulomb’s law, since some laws do not seem to involve any natural kinds. Bird puts this forcefully in his paper ‘Are Any Kinds Ontologically Fundamental‘, published in my Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics:

[T]he kind governed by Coulomb’s laws includes every object. Is this kind then, the charged-or-neutral kind, the most inclusive kind of all? That seems odd — what is so special about charge? Indeed, returning to Newton’s law, in Einstein’s reformulation, that too encompasses bodies of zero (rest-)mass (photons are subject to the same law). Hence there is a charged-or-neutral all-encompassing kind and there is a massive-or-massless kind, and these are coextensive. This is straining the position. What seems to be clear is that such laws have nothing to do with kinds at all. Rather, these are universal laws (they cover everything, without exception) and concern not the kinds to which entities belong but the properties (mass, charge) that the entities possess.

(Bird, ‘Are Any Kinds Ontologically Fundamental’, in T. E. Tahko, Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics, CUP 2012, p. 98.)

However, a natural reply suggests itself, namely, the distinction between laws that feature natural kinds and laws that do not feature kinds reflects the distinction between metaphysically necessary and metaphysically contingent laws. To my knowledge, Lowe himself has not entertained this type of reply, and I doubt that he would. There are at least two reasons why this reply conflicts with Lowe’s view. Firstly, it entails that there are probably very few genuine natural kinds, contrary to what Lowe seems to think. Secondly, Lowe leaves room for contingent laws which nevertheless feature natural kinds.

Now, what occurred to me is that this result fits my own views about natural kinds rather well (see my Natural Kind Essentialism Revisited). In particular, I think that there may be very few genuine, mind-independent natural kinds — and accordingly very few metaphysically necessary laws of nature. Moreover, I take it that the burden of proof is upon those whose postulate natural kinds in the first place and it is my aim to tie the idea of a genuine natural kind with the metaphysical necessity of laws in which such kinds feature. This, at any rate, seems to be a possible view. I’d be curious to hear any reactions to it (drop me a message and I can send you the draft as well).

Which laws would turn out metaphysically necessary on this view? I think that one of the best candidates is the Pauli Exclusion Principle (PEP). PEP states that if we have two identical and indistinguishable electrons (or other fermions), the wavefunction for the system of those two electrons must be anti-symmetric. It is sometimes said that the Pauli Exclusion Principle is responsible for the space-occupying behaviour of matter, as it prevents atoms from collapsing together. The electrons must occupy successively higher orbitals to prevent a shared quantum state and hence not all electrons can collapse to the lowest orbital. So, it is a property of any closed system, such as an atom, that any two electrons in that closed system cannot have the same set of the four quantum numbers. When the conception of laws at hand is applied to this case, a plausible way to understand PEP is in terms of the attributes of electrons and other fermions. In particular, it is part of the nature of fermions that they behave in a manner that is constrained by PEP. This may be the result of a combination of the modal constraints that particular attributes of fermions — such as their half-integer spin — have. The role of spin is highlighted by the fact that particles of half-integer spin must have anti-symmetric wavefunctions, whereas particles of integer spin must have symmetric wavefunctions. The latter, bosons, are not subject to PEP.

Clearly, the fact that the behaviour of fermions is constrained by PEP is at least partly due to their half-integer spin, given that on the view under consideration, metaphysically necessary laws are simply facts about the natures of natural kinds. It is also plausible that half-integer spin is essential for fermions, since it is what differentiates them from bosons; the behaviour of fermions and bosons is radically different especially at low temperatures. If Lowe (2006: 169–170) is right, we can be fairly confident that both fermions and bosons have most of their attributes essentially, that is, they depend for their existence and identity on these attributes. Hence, both are likely candidates for genuine kinds. For further discussion to the effect that PEP must feature genuine natural kinds, see my ‘Boundaries in Reality‘.

If I am correct, it might seem that there is very little reason to consider contingent laws to be laws at all. Why shouldn’t we just say that all laws are metaphysically necessary — because they feature natural kinds — and what remains are not laws at all? Indeed, the view at hand does suggest that there is an ontological difference between contingent and necessary laws. I do not consider this to be ‘untidy’, pace Bird, since the difference between these two classes of laws can be explained in virtue of their source. But I am open to calling the contingent laws something else than laws. Perhaps better, we could call contingent laws weak and necessary laws strong, reflecting their source and applicability. Well, I’m curious to see if this view holds water, but it would seem to fit nicely with my views about natural kinds.

The Philosophical Significance of the Higgs ‘Discovery’

04 Jul
July 4, 2012

Today, the ‘discovery’ of the elusive Higgs Boson was announced at CERN. ‘Discovery’ in scare quotes, because when dealing with the criteria for new discoveries in fundamental physics, there is always some arbitrariness, which I will explain in a moment. I’ve just watched the live webcast of the talks at CERN today, and as expected, they were built around the announcement that the Higgs has been discovered at ~125 GeV.

There are plenty of excellent resources in the internet explaining the significance of the Higgs boson, and the ramifications that the discovery has for future physics. CERN has a sort of FAQ about the Higgs here. In addition, see for instance Richard Ruiz’s post ‘What Comes Next’ in the Quantum Diaries blog, or Matt Strassler’s ‘Why the Higgs Particle Matters’ in his Of Particular Significance blog. Both blogs are full of interesting and useful posts on the Higgs and related matters. But as interesting as all these posts from the point of view of physicists are, they leave open several questions that might be of interest to philosophers. In this post I will attempt to address some of those questions, and analyse the philosophical significance of the Higgs.

As a disclaimer, I have to emphasise that I’m by no means an expert on particle physics, and a lot of what I say below builds on the material from the mentioned sources. I also wrote this rather hastily while listening to the talks, so I apologise for any errors in the science. However, these should have little effect on my philosophical analysis in any case.

The facts, in my understanding, are as follows:

  • Both of the independent groups, ATLAS and CMS, presented strong results to the effect that there is a Higgs boson near 125 GeV.
  • Although all the data is compatible with the discovered boson being the Standard Model Higgs, there is no confirmation of this yet.
  • The picture could be much more complicated than what has been seen so far; there may be a number of other Higgs bosons, corresponding to different Higgs fields.
  • What was discovered is most likely a scalar particle (with a spin of zero), and helps to explain electroweak symmetry breaking, but the details remain open.

Now, to begin with, something should be said about what constitutes a “discovery”. As I understand it, particle physics has an accepted definition for what is sufficient to claim a discovery: 5.0 sigma significance, i.e. level of certainty up to five standard deviations. In statistical terms, this means a probability of less than one in a million that the observed phenomenon is produced by something else than the postulated Higgs, namely statistical fluctuation. The reason for this type of talk is of course that the Higgs cannot be observed directly. Rather, we can observe decay products, such as photons, which could be produced by a number of phenomena that have to be ruled out. This also makes it quite clear that there is always an aspect of fallibility in these types of results.

We have a discovery! (Ripped off from Joe Incandela's (CMS) talk today.)

We have a discovery! (Ripped off from Joe Incandela’s (CMS) talk today.)

Interestingly, at the press conference after the talks at CERN, the journalists (most of whom asked pretty idiotic questions) kept asking whether it is the Higgs that has been discovered, clearly not quite understanding what they even mean by the Higgs. Part of the problem, I think, is that the people answering the questions were experimental physicists, not theoretical. They could’ve done a better job explaining the theory. To put it simply, we’re looking for an explanation for the electroweak symmetry breaking familiar from the Higgs mechanism. The Higgs mechanism postulates the Higgs field which is responsible for the masses of elementary particles. In some sense, the Higgs is just whatever serves the purpose of explaining this phenomenon. But in effect I think that people are associating this with the Standard Model Higgs, i.e. the Higgs that has the properties compatible with the standard model (among other things, a spin of zero). Right now, this question remains open. Emphasising the words of Rolf Heuer, I would say that there is a Higgs, because whatever has been discovered, it’s at least a part of the explanation for the electroweak symmetry breaking, but it might not be the explanation fully compatible with the Standard Model.

In the interviews at CERN aired after the main event, Philip Warren Anderson, who postulated the Higgs mechanism in 1962, said something quite interesting about the original modelling of the Higgs mechanism and the postulation of the Higgs. He indicated that back in the sixties they didn’t expect that the model was anything more than that: an interesting model which probably has little to do with real physics. In particular, Anderson praised ‘imagination’ as the source of the modelling, emphasising that it’s ‘simple ideas’ that we have to explore. This aligns nicely with the methodology of scientific reasoning (and indeed “discovery”) that I’ve proposed in a couple of papers, ‘A New Definition of A Priori Knowledge: In Search of a Modal Basis‘ and ‘A Priori and A Posteriori: A Bootstrapping Relationship‘ in particular. In short, what Anderson describes as ‘imagination’ is what I consider to be a priori modelling of the space of metaphysically possible scenarios that could explain the data (the a posteriori basis) we currently have. Now, this is where the Higgs (mechanism) gets interesting, it’s a theoretical model that has now, after 50 years, been virtually confirmed with an enormous experimental effort. But I think it is a mistake to focus on the ‘discovery of the Higgs particle’. Instead, we should congratulate the teams at CERN about the confirmation of a possible explanation (a model) for one of the central questions in physics, not the discovery of a particle.

Physicists already knew that there must be something like the Higgs field which is responsible for the mass of things like W and Z bosons. They want to study the properties of this field, which can be done by finding and studying the corresponding Higgs particle. But: the Higgs field may not be elementary, it could be composed of several other fields, each of which would have a corresponding Higgs boson. So, we know of a number of possible combinations of particles and fields that would explain our current empirical data — and many of these options are still live.

In fact, even in the now unlikely event (less than one in a million) that the boson confirmed by the data were just a statistical fluctuation, or that something else is responsible for the observed deviations in the decay products, we could say something interesting. Whatever the arrangement of elementary fields and particles is, we do know that it manifests itself in such a way that we observe massive particles (that is, particles that have mass) like W and Z bosons. Hence, when we quantify over the Higgs boson by asking: ‘Does the Higgs boson exist?’, we are primarily interested in an explanation for previous data, that is, we want to understand the mechanism which is responsible for the emergence of massive particles. To this end, it makes little difference whether there exists such a thing as the Higgs boson. The experiments at the LHC are designed to reveal us something more about the nature of the Higgs field or fields, and we already know of the existence of something like the Higgs field(s). Now it seems very likely that at least one such field exists, and it’s the decay products of a boson corresponding to that field that ATLAS and CMS have been studying.

Philosophical analysis

Philosophically, perhaps the most interesting question is this: how do we know that the physicists are talking about the same thing when they debate the properties and the existence of the Higgs boson? There is certainly some common ground between the disputants, such as the Standard Model of quantum mechanics, but that is hardly sufficient to ensure that the disputants are indeed talking about the same thing, since the discovered boson may not even be the Standard Model Higgs (we will hopefully know in a couple of months). Building on Matt Strassler’s Higgs FAQ, here are the options (assuming that the announced results are not a mere statistical fluctuation):

  1. There is a Standard Model Higgs, with a mass of ~125 GeV.
  2. There is a Standard Model Higgs, but some other yet unknown particles and/or forces cause it to behave in unexpected ways, making it difficult to observe.
  3. There are several Higgs bosons, which are probably more difficult to observe than a Standard Model Higgs.
  4. There is no Standard Model Higgs boson, but rather something completely different: new particles and/or forces.

From what was announced today, there is no deciding between these options, but it seems that a lot of people are hoping for (1). I gather that (2) is unlikely, but it’s not impossible: the boson that we have discovered could turn out to be one of these unknown particles that mask the Standard Model Higgs. I don’t think that this is an option that will be seriously entertained from now on though, at least insofar as the properties of the discovered boson don’t turn out to be really strange. (3) is certainly a live option, as the observed boson may not be the Standard Model Higgs, in which case there could be other Higgs bosons that are difficult to observe. (4) is also live, but it appears that the discovered boson fits the Standard Model to such an extent that it must have some relevance to the Higgs mechanism, which would suggest that “something completely different” is unlikely.

Given the variety of options, how do we know that theoretical physicists are talking about the same thing when they talk about the Higgs boson? After all, there might be no Standard Model Higgs. There may even be several things. Or there might be some other phenomena responsible for the observed decay products. In fact, physicists might not even agree about what the options are — the list above is certainly simplified. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that even large portions of the Standard Model have to be abandoned. The philosophical upshot is that there is no clear sense of what enables us to determine whether the debate is even substantial. At the extreme end of the scale, it could be claimed that we simply do not know what it is that we are debating about. And I don’t think that this is an exception, it happens all over the place.

But clearly there is something substantial at issue here! Despite even fundamental disagreements about the background, physicists have been able to design experiments to test the various options. There must be something that is shared here. But it’s a mistake to think that it is the existence of something — something that we can quantify over with the existential quantifier — that has to be shared.

Let me venture a positive proposal: we know that the Higgs debate is substantial because we know what the Standard Model Higgs would be like if it were to exist, that is, we have a previous grasp of its nature or essence. This is what I take Philip Warren Anderson to have been hinting at. What does this previous grasp of essence entail? It entails that we have an idea as to what would explain the empirical data that we currently have. Among other things, we have already observed W and Z bosons and other heavy particles. It turns out that unless something like the Higgs field(s) is postulated, the Standard Model will have to be abandoned. So, the need to postulate the Higgs field(s), or the Higgs mechanism in its entirety, stems from the need to explain how elementary particles get their mass. The options listed above exhaust the logical space, or most of it at any rate, that fits the empirical data.

When the search for the Standard Model Higgs began, its possible mass range was fairly wide. The LHC ruled out chunks of it little by little, finally arriving at ~125GeV. But each of the specific masses in that original range were possible for the kind of thing that we are looking for. My suggestion is that we must know what kind of thing(s) would explain the data before we can ‘imagine’ possible models, like Anderson seems to think. It may turn out that it is a merely possible kind of thing, as it could for instance turn out that the Higgs field is not elementary and in fact consists of a number of other fields. But even in this case, we had a previous grasp of the natures or essences of the other possible kinds of things that would have explained the data, even though no such things exist. This story does not reflect a fundamental quantificational structure (contra Ted Sider’s suggestion in his Writing the Book of The World (2011, OUP)), it reflects a fundamental natural kind structure.

Well, there’s a lot more to say about all this, and especially about the process of scientific modelling via ‘imagination’, but I’ll leave that for a paper! I find the case of the Higgs to be a fascinating example of scientific modelling and the effort to verify these models has been impressive, but my reading of what the basis of scientific modelling is may seem controversial to many. I’ve used the Higgs as an example in many papers and talks and will certainly continue to do so; I’m encouraged by Anderson’s comments in particular. I think that a lot of the confusion surrounding the issue (and evident from the press conference questions, among other things) has to do exactly with the red herring of trying to identify with a single, quantifiable particle, THE Higgs boson, whereas we should really focus our attention on the wider explanatory effort and process of modelling itself.

Conference: Necessity, Lincoln

01 Jul
July 1, 2012

This conference looks amazing, and I’ll certainly go if I happen to be anywhere near Nebraska in March 2013, although I’m afraid that it’s quite unlikely. Kit Fine is the obvious attraction, but I expect that there might be an interesting dialogue between Boris Kment (whom I had the pleasure of meeting recently at the Carolina Metaphysics Workshop) and Tim Williamson. You can read about my take on Williamson’s counterfactual analysis of modality in my forthcoming paper, ‘Counterfactuals and Modal Epistemology‘. Alan Sidelle’s approach to modality is more deflationary, but should provide for equally interesting dialogue, whereas Markus Schrenk has some fascinating work on laws and necessity.

If you’re going to this one, let me know!

The Fifth Annual Chambers Philosophy Conference:

Necessity

March 15-16, 2013
University of Nebraska at Lincoln

Kit Fine
New York University

Boris Kment
Princeton University

Markus Schrenk
Universität zu Köln

Alan Sidelle
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Timothy Williamson
University of Oxford

Jessica Wilson
University of Toronto

Takashi Yagisawa
California State University, Northridge

This conference was inspired by two fairly recent, and fairly independent, conversations about necessity. One, under the heading “metaphysics of science,” is about whether any purported distinction between nomological and metaphysical necessity is dissolved if natural kinds have essential, causally-relevant properties. Another, under the heading “modal metaphysics,” concerns what, if anything, makes necessity claims true. These conversations prompted the thought that an exploration of necessity that crosses philosophical sub-disciplines could be fruitful. A general investigation into the nature of necessity would welcome approaches from logic, philosophy of language, epistemology, as well as metaphysics and philosophy of science, and consider such questions as:

  • What does it mean for a claim to be necessarily true?
  • If any claims are necessarily true, what accounts for that? What are the truth-makers or “grounds” for necessity claims?
  • How do we know that a claim is not only true, but necessarily true? How can necessity claims be epistemically justified?
  • Are there different kinds of necessity claims: logical, metaphysical, physical …? If so, do different necessities differ with respect to their grounds, or epistemic accessibility?
  • How is necessity related to analyticity, essence, natural kind, power, cause, or natural law?

For more information, please contact:

Jennifer McKitrick: jmckitrick2@unl.edu
Reina Hayaki: rhayaki@unl.edu

Conference: Causation in Science – Temporality, Modality and Reduction, Norway

11 May
May 11, 2012

If you haven’t yet heard of CauSci, lead by Rani Lill Anjum, then this conference will serve to highlight the project. Looks great!

CauSci is pleased to announce our next international event, Causation in Science – Temporality, Modality and Reduction.

The workshop will take place at UMB on 3-5 September 2012.

See the list of titles and abstracts here: http://www.umb.no/causci/article/cauphy-program

More information will be posted on the webpage closer to the event about travel and accommodation. http://www.umb.no/causci/article/causation-in-physics

Registration is free and open to anyone. Please register by sending an e-mail to sigurd.tonnessen@uit.no within 1 August.

Speakers:

Mauricio Suárez, Complutense University Madrid and LSE, London
Iñaki San Pedro, Complutense University Madrid
Carl Hoefer, ICREA & Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona
Mauro Dorato, University of Rome 3
Ragnar Fjelland, SVT, University of Bergen
Stephen Mumford, University of Nottingham
Allen Stairs, University of Maryland
Sigurd Tønnessen, University of Tromsø
Johan Arnt Myrstad, University of Nordland, Bodø
Dagfinn Døhl Dybvig, University of Nordland, Bodø
Thor Sandmel, University of Oslo
Anita Leirfall, University of Bergen
Fredrik Andersen, Norwegian University of Life Sciences (UMB), Ås
Elias Núñez, Norwegian University of Life Sciences (UMB), Ås
Rani Lill Anjum, Norwegian University of Life Sciences (UMB), Ås

Background
The aim of the project Causation in Science is to develop a metaphysically plausible notion of causation that is also scientifically robust. It is hard to see how this can be achieved without considering some of the wider issues related to a realist notion of causation in modern physics. The following themes will be discussed at the workshop:

Causal realism
The concept of causation is controversial in physics. On the one hand, there is a view expressed by Bertrand Russell, and currently revived by Huw Price and others, that causation should have no place within an informed objective description of the world. On the other hand, many of the key notions employed by modern physics are characterised in dispositional terms, such as spin, charge, mass and radioactive decay. Causal dispositionalism suggests that this gives us at least some causation within physics.

Simultaneity
Quantum entanglement has been suggested by some as demonstrating that there can be simultaneous causation at a distance. Such causal non-locality, if it really is the case, would count against the spatial contiguity that Hume thought conceptually central to causation. Relativity theory, however, seems to imply that there cannot be simultaneity of cause and effect. If they are spatially distinct events, there is no sense in which they are simultaneous, and any causal influence between them must take time to travel. The description of simultaneity in physics thus seems to have philosophical implications for how to best understand causation with respect to locality.

Time and space
In modern physical theories there are various theories of space/time theories, some of which seem irreconcilable (for instance, standard Quantum Mechanics utilises absolute space/time while Quantum Field Theory utilises relative space/time). There are also diverging theories on the ontological nature of space/time ranging from illusion to physical object. What conclusions we should draw concerning simultaneity and causation will depend on how we understand the notions of space and time.

Modality
Another central issue is the kind of modality that is found in physics. Deterministic, indeterministic and probabilistic laws are usually linked to modal notions of necessity, randomness/pure contingency and probability. The modality of a tendency is more than pure contingency, yet short of necessity, and it does not carry any commitment to determinism or indeterminism. There might, however, be some irreducibly probabilistic tendencies. In virtue of what a law is supposed to be deterministic, indeterministic or probabilistic is thus something we need to make explicit. Another issue is how these modalities relate to predictability.

Reductionism, holism and emergence
Physics is often presented as the key, fundamental science to which all other sciences are supposed to reduce, be modelled, or at least relate. An open question is still whether there could be a role for holism and emergence within physics itself. If so, this would at least leave open the possibility for real emergence within other sciences.

Program: http://www.umb.no/causci/article/cauphy-program