Tag Archive for: Ted Sider

The Philosophical Significance of the Higgs ‘Discovery’

04 Jul
July 4, 2012

Today, the ‘discovery’ of the elusive Higgs Boson was announced at CERN. ‘Discovery’ in scare quotes, because when dealing with the criteria for new discoveries in fundamental physics, there is always some arbitrariness, which I will explain in a moment. I’ve just watched the live webcast of the talks at CERN today, and as expected, they were built around the announcement that the Higgs has been discovered at ~125 GeV.

There are plenty of excellent resources in the internet explaining the significance of the Higgs boson, and the ramifications that the discovery has for future physics. CERN has a sort of FAQ about the Higgs here. In addition, see for instance Richard Ruiz’s post ‘What Comes Next’ in the Quantum Diaries blog, or Matt Strassler’s ‘Why the Higgs Particle Matters’ in his Of Particular Significance blog. Both blogs are full of interesting and useful posts on the Higgs and related matters. But as interesting as all these posts from the point of view of physicists are, they leave open several questions that might be of interest to philosophers. In this post I will attempt to address some of those questions, and analyse the philosophical significance of the Higgs.

As a disclaimer, I have to emphasise that I’m by no means an expert on particle physics, and a lot of what I say below builds on the material from the mentioned sources. I also wrote this rather hastily while listening to the talks, so I apologise for any errors in the science. However, these should have little effect on my philosophical analysis in any case.

The facts, in my understanding, are as follows:

  • Both of the independent groups, ATLAS and CMS, presented strong results to the effect that there is a Higgs boson near 125 GeV.
  • Although all the data is compatible with the discovered boson being the Standard Model Higgs, there is no confirmation of this yet.
  • The picture could be much more complicated than what has been seen so far; there may be a number of other Higgs bosons, corresponding to different Higgs fields.
  • What was discovered is most likely a scalar particle (with a spin of zero), and helps to explain electroweak symmetry breaking, but the details remain open.

Now, to begin with, something should be said about what constitutes a “discovery”. As I understand it, particle physics has an accepted definition for what is sufficient to claim a discovery: 5.0 sigma significance, i.e. level of certainty up to five standard deviations. In statistical terms, this means a probability of less than one in a million that the observed phenomenon is produced by something else than the postulated Higgs, namely statistical fluctuation. The reason for this type of talk is of course that the Higgs cannot be observed directly. Rather, we can observe decay products, such as photons, which could be produced by a number of phenomena that have to be ruled out. This also makes it quite clear that there is always an aspect of fallibility in these types of results.

We have a discovery! (Ripped off from Joe Incandela's (CMS) talk today.)

We have a discovery! (Ripped off from Joe Incandela’s (CMS) talk today.)

Interestingly, at the press conference after the talks at CERN, the journalists (most of whom asked pretty idiotic questions) kept asking whether it is the Higgs that has been discovered, clearly not quite understanding what they even mean by the Higgs. Part of the problem, I think, is that the people answering the questions were experimental physicists, not theoretical. They could’ve done a better job explaining the theory. To put it simply, we’re looking for an explanation for the electroweak symmetry breaking familiar from the Higgs mechanism. The Higgs mechanism postulates the Higgs field which is responsible for the masses of elementary particles. In some sense, the Higgs is just whatever serves the purpose of explaining this phenomenon. But in effect I think that people are associating this with the Standard Model Higgs, i.e. the Higgs that has the properties compatible with the standard model (among other things, a spin of zero). Right now, this question remains open. Emphasising the words of Rolf Heuer, I would say that there is a Higgs, because whatever has been discovered, it’s at least a part of the explanation for the electroweak symmetry breaking, but it might not be the explanation fully compatible with the Standard Model.

In the interviews at CERN aired after the main event, Philip Warren Anderson, who postulated the Higgs mechanism in 1962, said something quite interesting about the original modelling of the Higgs mechanism and the postulation of the Higgs. He indicated that back in the sixties they didn’t expect that the model was anything more than that: an interesting model which probably has little to do with real physics. In particular, Anderson praised ‘imagination’ as the source of the modelling, emphasising that it’s ‘simple ideas’ that we have to explore. This aligns nicely with the methodology of scientific reasoning (and indeed “discovery”) that I’ve proposed in a couple of papers, ‘A New Definition of A Priori Knowledge: In Search of a Modal Basis‘ and ‘A Priori and A Posteriori: A Bootstrapping Relationship‘ in particular. In short, what Anderson describes as ‘imagination’ is what I consider to be a priori modelling of the space of metaphysically possible scenarios that could explain the data (the a posteriori basis) we currently have. Now, this is where the Higgs (mechanism) gets interesting, it’s a theoretical model that has now, after 50 years, been virtually confirmed with an enormous experimental effort. But I think it is a mistake to focus on the ‘discovery of the Higgs particle’. Instead, we should congratulate the teams at CERN about the confirmation of a possible explanation (a model) for one of the central questions in physics, not the discovery of a particle.

Physicists already knew that there must be something like the Higgs field which is responsible for the mass of things like W and Z bosons. They want to study the properties of this field, which can be done by finding and studying the corresponding Higgs particle. But: the Higgs field may not be elementary, it could be composed of several other fields, each of which would have a corresponding Higgs boson. So, we know of a number of possible combinations of particles and fields that would explain our current empirical data — and many of these options are still live.

In fact, even in the now unlikely event (less than one in a million) that the boson confirmed by the data were just a statistical fluctuation, or that something else is responsible for the observed deviations in the decay products, we could say something interesting. Whatever the arrangement of elementary fields and particles is, we do know that it manifests itself in such a way that we observe massive particles (that is, particles that have mass) like W and Z bosons. Hence, when we quantify over the Higgs boson by asking: ‘Does the Higgs boson exist?’, we are primarily interested in an explanation for previous data, that is, we want to understand the mechanism which is responsible for the emergence of massive particles. To this end, it makes little difference whether there exists such a thing as the Higgs boson. The experiments at the LHC are designed to reveal us something more about the nature of the Higgs field or fields, and we already know of the existence of something like the Higgs field(s). Now it seems very likely that at least one such field exists, and it’s the decay products of a boson corresponding to that field that ATLAS and CMS have been studying.

Philosophical analysis

Philosophically, perhaps the most interesting question is this: how do we know that the physicists are talking about the same thing when they debate the properties and the existence of the Higgs boson? There is certainly some common ground between the disputants, such as the Standard Model of quantum mechanics, but that is hardly sufficient to ensure that the disputants are indeed talking about the same thing, since the discovered boson may not even be the Standard Model Higgs (we will hopefully know in a couple of months). Building on Matt Strassler’s Higgs FAQ, here are the options (assuming that the announced results are not a mere statistical fluctuation):

  1. There is a Standard Model Higgs, with a mass of ~125 GeV.
  2. There is a Standard Model Higgs, but some other yet unknown particles and/or forces cause it to behave in unexpected ways, making it difficult to observe.
  3. There are several Higgs bosons, which are probably more difficult to observe than a Standard Model Higgs.
  4. There is no Standard Model Higgs boson, but rather something completely different: new particles and/or forces.

From what was announced today, there is no deciding between these options, but it seems that a lot of people are hoping for (1). I gather that (2) is unlikely, but it’s not impossible: the boson that we have discovered could turn out to be one of these unknown particles that mask the Standard Model Higgs. I don’t think that this is an option that will be seriously entertained from now on though, at least insofar as the properties of the discovered boson don’t turn out to be really strange. (3) is certainly a live option, as the observed boson may not be the Standard Model Higgs, in which case there could be other Higgs bosons that are difficult to observe. (4) is also live, but it appears that the discovered boson fits the Standard Model to such an extent that it must have some relevance to the Higgs mechanism, which would suggest that “something completely different” is unlikely.

Given the variety of options, how do we know that theoretical physicists are talking about the same thing when they talk about the Higgs boson? After all, there might be no Standard Model Higgs. There may even be several things. Or there might be some other phenomena responsible for the observed decay products. In fact, physicists might not even agree about what the options are — the list above is certainly simplified. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that even large portions of the Standard Model have to be abandoned. The philosophical upshot is that there is no clear sense of what enables us to determine whether the debate is even substantial. At the extreme end of the scale, it could be claimed that we simply do not know what it is that we are debating about. And I don’t think that this is an exception, it happens all over the place.

But clearly there is something substantial at issue here! Despite even fundamental disagreements about the background, physicists have been able to design experiments to test the various options. There must be something that is shared here. But it’s a mistake to think that it is the existence of something — something that we can quantify over with the existential quantifier — that has to be shared.

Let me venture a positive proposal: we know that the Higgs debate is substantial because we know what the Standard Model Higgs would be like if it were to exist, that is, we have a previous grasp of its nature or essence. This is what I take Philip Warren Anderson to have been hinting at. What does this previous grasp of essence entail? It entails that we have an idea as to what would explain the empirical data that we currently have. Among other things, we have already observed W and Z bosons and other heavy particles. It turns out that unless something like the Higgs field(s) is postulated, the Standard Model will have to be abandoned. So, the need to postulate the Higgs field(s), or the Higgs mechanism in its entirety, stems from the need to explain how elementary particles get their mass. The options listed above exhaust the logical space, or most of it at any rate, that fits the empirical data.

When the search for the Standard Model Higgs began, its possible mass range was fairly wide. The LHC ruled out chunks of it little by little, finally arriving at ~125GeV. But each of the specific masses in that original range were possible for the kind of thing that we are looking for. My suggestion is that we must know what kind of thing(s) would explain the data before we can ‘imagine’ possible models, like Anderson seems to think. It may turn out that it is a merely possible kind of thing, as it could for instance turn out that the Higgs field is not elementary and in fact consists of a number of other fields. But even in this case, we had a previous grasp of the natures or essences of the other possible kinds of things that would have explained the data, even though no such things exist. This story does not reflect a fundamental quantificational structure (contra Ted Sider’s suggestion in his Writing the Book of The World (2011, OUP)), it reflects a fundamental natural kind structure.

Well, there’s a lot more to say about all this, and especially about the process of scientific modelling via ‘imagination’, but I’ll leave that for a paper! I find the case of the Higgs to be a fascinating example of scientific modelling and the effort to verify these models has been impressive, but my reading of what the basis of scientific modelling is may seem controversial to many. I’ve used the Higgs as an example in many papers and talks and will certainly continue to do so; I’m encouraged by Anderson’s comments in particular. I think that a lot of the confusion surrounding the issue (and evident from the press conference questions, among other things) has to do exactly with the red herring of trying to identify with a single, quantifiable particle, THE Higgs boson, whereas we should really focus our attention on the wider explanatory effort and process of modelling itself.

Minimal Truthmakers

22 May
May 22, 2012

I’ve been working on a paper on minimal truthmakers with an ex-colleague of mine from Durham, Donnchadh O’Conaill (we’ve previously written a paper together on monism). The paper is now at the stage where we could use some feedback. Rather than posting a link to the draft here, I’ll post this general call for volunteers — drop me a message if you think you might like to read it and could perhaps provide some feedback, or even just a general impression. We make some use of the work of Armstrong, Fine, Correia, Sider, and Schaffer, among others. The goal is to defend the usefulness of the notion of minimal truthmakers and to provide a definition of them, as well as give some reasons to think that there indeed are some minimal truthmakers. Our two primary arguments concern the explanatory value of minimal truthmakers, and the idea that at least ‘joint-carving’ (or fundamental) propositions are likely to have minimal truthmakers. The draft is about 8,000 words. The abstract is below.

A minimal truthmaker for a given proposition is the smallest portion of reality which can make this proposition true. Minimal truthmakers are frequently mentioned in the literature, and have been referred to as “of quite special importance for metaphysics” (Armstrong 2004, 19). However, there has been no systematic account of what minimal truthmakers are or of their importance. In this paper we shall clarify the notion of a minimal truthmaker for a given proposition, and argue that there is reason to think that at least some propositions have minimal truthmakers. We shall then argue that the notion of a minimal truthmaker can play a useful role in truthmaker theory, by helping to explain the truth of certain propositions as precisely as possible.

UNC-Chapel Hill Diaries #7

29 Mar
March 29, 2012

Previous entires: #1, #2, #3, #4, #5, #6.

In Durham, they sell metaphysics by the pound. (Ninth Street)

In Durham, they sell metaphysics by the pound. (Ninth Street)

Firstly, I’ve got another batch of talks coming up. First of them is tomorrow, Friday March 30 at Duke University (3:30pm, West Duke 202) in the colloquium series. I’ll be talking about ‘Quantification and Ontological Realism’. The talk will be followed by a reception, so stick around if you’re attending. I’m looking forward to this one, as I think I’ve got a nice paper. It’s mainly a critique of Ted Sider’s recent defence of fundamental, perfectly joint-carving quantification in his Writing the Book of the World (OUP, 2011). It’s nice to go to Durham too, since they have a “Metaphysical Shop” and all (see the photo)… Ninth Street, which is relatively close to the campus, has a very nice selection of shops and cafes.

Already on the following Wednesday, April 4, I’ll be talking at Boulder, Colorado (3:30pm, HLMS 141) with the title ‘(Neo-)Aristotelian Essentialism’. I’ll be in Boulder April 3-5.

Other than that, I haven’t got much in terms of news. I pretty much missed the whole of last week being ill with a flu. Fortunately it only hit me after the party that I organized with Elizabeth at our place. The party went well, although the turnout could’ve been better — we’re a little bit out of the way and not that many people know me yet. It was fun anyway, with a good mix of Chapel Hill faculty and graduate students. We also had someone from another college in North Carolina, whom I knew from a conference. Oh, and Peter van Inwagen showed up too, which was nice! Unfortunately I don’t have any photographic evidence of the gathering, as I was too busy entertaining guests. I particularly regret not snapping a photo of the all-vegan buffet feast that we prepared with Elizabeth. A list will have to suffice: vegan sushi, seitan-tomato-onion skewers in jerk marinade, seitan-pineapple skewers in lime marinade with lime and cilantro dip, olive-walnut rolls, green salad with vinaigrette, hummus tray with veggies, olives, gingerbread cookies, and a chocolate-cherry cake. We made everything from scratch (except the hummus), so it was a fair bit of work! But very enjoyable, and people seemed to like the food too.

Cardinals are quite common here

Cardinals are quite common here

I ended up missing talks by Ned Markosian and Jonathan Schaffer at Duke last week because of the illness. Fortunately I managed to catch Schaffer at Chapel Hill. He gave a talk on ‘Structural Equation Models of Metaphysical Structure’ — not a very informative title. Effectively he revised his story about grounding a bit and suggested that it’s best understood as analogous to causation, or as “metaphysical causation”. I wasn’t convinced, but I won’t go into the details as I wasn’t able to follow the talk that well in my tired post-flu state. I might get my hands on a draft of this paper though (for the metaphysics reading group), in which case I’ll perhaps report in more detail.

Unsurprisingly, my running has suffered a big blow in March: I’ve missed two full weeks of training, with a half decent week in between. I’m back at it now, but still not up to full health. I’m running the Tar Heel 10-miler on April 21, so I’ve got another three weeks or so to get back into racing shape. Did I mention that I’m gaining weight from all the tasty craft beer and cooking and Elizabeth’s baking and… Well, maybe some of it is muscle from the gym work, who knows.

Deer, from our kitchen window

Deer, from our kitchen window

It’s effectively summer here now. Spring came and went with the cherry blossoms, and we even had a sweltering day of +31 Celsius not long ago. It’s nice and green everywhere. I hope to do a photography walk soon to capture some of that green stuff. The nights are warm enough to sit outside gazing the stars. Wildlife is still active too. There was some kind of an eagle on our backyard last week; I tried to photograph it but couldn’t get close enough to get a nice focus. Instead I managed to capture the Cardinal that you can see above, although it’s not the best shot — I’d really need a decent zoom lens for these birds. We also have woodpeckers visiting frequently, but they’re rather shy birds. I still haven’t gotten a better shot of the deer either, so I’m attaching one of my older shots of a couple that were hanging out around our house.

"Caribe", at Sage Café

"Caribe", at Sage Café

We haven’t been out in Chapel Hill or around much recently, but we did make another trip to Sage Café — a nice vegetarian restaurant quite close to our place. You can get almost everything vegan as well. This time I remembered to bring my camera and snapped a photo of my dish, Caribe — Caribbean style black beans topped with a slice of avocado, served with rice, grilled spicy tofu & plaintains. It’s not the cheapest place, but the food is quite tasty.

I’ll report back after Boulder, I think. A friend of mine from Finland is coming to visit right after though, and we’re planning to do a week’s road trip, so I’ll be away for a bit.

UNC-Chapel Hill Diaries #4

27 Feb
February 27, 2012

Previous entires: #1, #2, #3.

Keeping busy here! We had a car for the weekend, mainly to get to the The North Carolina Philosophical Society Meeting with the South Carolina Society for Philosophy at Elon University, where I gave a talk on quantification and ontological realism. Elon is a mere 40min drive from Chapel Hill, but the intercity connections here on public transportation are not very good, so the only way to get there was by car. No matter, we made use of the car on Sunday as well, heading to the Uwharrie National Forest, about 100 miles from Chapel Hill.

Elon University Campus

Elon University Campus

Let me report briefly on the conference to begin with. The host organization, Elon University, is rather small — the town of Elon itself is also tiny, virtually just a suburb of Burlington, which is not a huge city itself. The university is basically the whole town, and there’s virtually nothing there. The campus does look nice enough, but we figured that it was a bit of a mistake to have booked a hotel in the area since there was nothing to do. Oh well, it was nice enough to get away from Chapel Hill for a night. I ended up skipping quite a few sessions of the conference because I was there with Elizabeth (I don’t drive, so I needed her anyway), but there weren’t that many talks that I was interested in to begin with. It was very low key, even though there were seven or eight parallel sessions and hence quite a few talks.

My talk at Elon, featuring some Prezi action

My talk at Elon, featuring some Prezi action

I was on at the very end of the first day at the conference. I had a reasonable audience of 10-15 people; none of the talks that I attended had much larger audiences. I was surprised to see that very few people had bothered to prepare slides of any kind, so my lively Prezi presentation did its job quite well, and there was a decent discussion afterwards. The slots were mere 40min though, including discussion, so I couldn’t say quite as much as I would’ve wanted to. The goal of the talk was really just to test a few ideas that emerged when reading Ted Sider’s new book, Writing the Book of the World. Basically I have issues about his claim that defending the fundamentality of quantification is the best way to argue against ontological deflationism. To my mind, the focus on quantificational questions is misplaced: the question of quantification is independent of the question of realism. So, I’m arguing that Sider has not given us very good reasons to think that quantification carves at the joints, or that anything carves at the joints perfectly — it seems central to his project to identify some examples of perfect joint-carving (Sider suggests that, in addition to quantification, things like electron and mass are likely candidates). Well, you can check out my Prezi slides, linked above, if you’re interested, but I will write much more about this in the coming month, since I’m giving a full talk on the topic of ‘Quantification and Realism’ at the Duke University colloquium on March 30.

Talking about talks, I’ve updated the list of my talks this spring/summer. Note that there is a new addition, coming up already this Thursday, March 1 (4pm), at UNC Greensboro. My topic there is ‘The Epistemology of Essence’ — virtually the same talk that I gave in Chapel Hill recently, and which I will give again at the Kripke Center in CUNY, New York on Monday, March 5. This is a major theme in my research, so I don’t mind the repetition; the topic is very much a neglected one and I’d like to make as many people as possible aware about the problematics.

Reading at home on a snowy day.

Reading at home on a snowy day.

By the way, we got some snow here last week! It was rather surprising, given that we’ve already had some days with +23 Celsius, but the difference between day and night temperatures here can be.. well, like night and day! The snow did swiftly melt the next day though.

In addition to my own talks, there are some interesting talks coming up in Chapel Hill and Duke. Philip Kitcher is visiting here at the moment and giving a total of five talks in three days! His main event is the Michael Polanyi Lecture in the History and Philosophy of Natural Science. I’m quite busy with a number of things at the moment, so I might not be able to catch very many of Kitcher’s talks, but I hope to make it at least to his talk on mathematical truth at Duke on Wednesday.

The Metaphysics Reading Group meets at the Departmental Library

The Metaphysics Reading Group meets at the Departmental Library

We’ve also had another meeting of the metaphysics reading group. It was pretty heavy this time, as we read Peter van Inwagen’s draft on ontological levels and fundamentality, with Peter himself as well as Bob Adams attending. It was a pleasure to see these two prominent philosophers debating, although I would’ve had a lot to say about the topic myself as well! Anyway, the metaphysics reading group has turned out to be an excellent venue for informal discussion with some good metaphysicians.

Uwharrie National Forest

Uwharrie National Forest

Well, that’s a lot of work related stuff, but as I mentioned, we did make a trip to the Uwharrie National Forest for some trail running as well. Since we were going to have the car for the weekend anyway, we decided to check out one of the several National Parks in North Carolina. It looked like there would be a nice ~30km loop that should be runnable, so we set off to do that as our long run of the week. The day turned out to be nice and sunny, although not very warm — perfect for running though. The trail itself was well marked and mostly very good to run on. There aren’t many mountains in the state, but the landscape was rolling and my Garmin did report a total height gain of 856m, which is probably about right. In the end the trail wasn’t that interesting, as the wintry yet snowless terrain got a bit repetitive and there was a distinct absence of wildlife (at least compared to what we see out of our kitchen window!), but there were some very pretty sections. It was a nice day out and we could certainly feel the effect of the trail the next day. Total running time was just under four hours, so the pace was easy but not bad for rolling trails.

Trail running in Uwharrie National Forest

Trail running in Uwharrie National Forest

After the trail run we drove to the capital of the state, Raleigh, roughly 100 miles from the forest. It’s not very far from Chapel Hill, but, once again, not very easily accessed with public transportation. It was about time to check the city out though, as there does seem to be a number of interesting restaurants, cafés, and bars there. We only had time to check out one place this time though, namely The Remedy Diner, which turned out to be quite pleasant. There’s a nice selection of vegan and vegetarian dishes well marked on the menu, and they also do some interesting cocktails (not that we tried any). I had some vegan meatballs with squash “spaghetti”, topped off with Daiya shreds; Elizabeth had a sub with the same vegan meatballs. They also claim to have a number of vegan desserts, but they were out of all but one, a sopapilla cheesecake, which we had (and enjoyed, although the portion was rather small). Anyway, it was a nice meal after the run, although perhaps nothing mind-blowing, especially given the fact that the place wasn’t exactly cheap. I think we’ll make another trip to Raleigh at some point, hopefully spending a night there as well.

Ok, that’s probably enough stuff to digest for a few days; I’ll report back after my talk at Greensboro. Soon after that, on Sunday, we’re heading to New York (11h train trip!), where we’ll be for three nights. We’ll take the train back in two stages, stopping by at Washington D.C. for two nights (just touristy things there), and then heading back to Chapel Hill on Friday.

Summer School: Metaphysical Mayhem, Rutgers

06 Feb
February 6, 2012

This is a great opportunity for graduate students interested in hot topics in contemporary analytic metaphysics, Hosted by Rutgers University, taking place this May, and featuring some leading names in metaphysics!

Details copied from the Metaphysical Mayhem website.

Metaphysical Mayhem is back! Rutgers University will be hosting a 5-day summer school for graduate students May 14-18, 2012. John Hawthorne, Katherine Hawley, Ted Sider, Jonathan Schaffer, and Dean Zimmerman will lead the seminars on a variety of topics in metaphysics, including: natural properties, composition as identity, grounding, metaphysical explanation, and stuff like that…

We want the sessions to retain the dynamic of a graduate a seminar, and the seminar room is not large, so space is limited. Approximately ten graduate students from graduate programs outside the New York City/New Jersey area will be provided with room and board for the duration of the conference, hosted by Rutgers graduate students (in their homes or apartments). Subventions for travel may also be available. To apply for one of these ten slots, students should send an e-mail to Matthew Benton at mbenton@philosophy.rutgers.edu with the following attachments:

1. A brief (300-500 word) description of one’s interests in metaphysics.
2. CV
3. Unofficial transcript
4. A paper on any topic in Metaphysics

In addition, we ask that a professor familiar with the student’s work submit a very brief letter of recommendation (not more than a paragraph) to the same e-mail address (applicants should mention their references in the application e-mail).
The remainder of the participants in the seminar will be chosen from graduate students at Rutgers and at programs in the greater NYC/NJ area. Non-Rutgers students from local graduate programs should send the five items listed above to Matthew Benton, along with the name of a faculty member in his or her department willing to serve as a reference.

Lunch will be provided for all participants. Graduate students from NYC/NJ area schools will be responsible for their own accommodations and for most evening meals.

The deadline for applications is February 24, and participants will be chosen by March 9.